CWE-328 Base Draft

Use of Weak Hash

This vulnerability occurs when software uses a hashing algorithm that is cryptographically weak, allowing attackers to feasibly reverse the hash to find the original input, find a different input…

Definition

What is CWE-328?

This vulnerability occurs when software uses a hashing algorithm that is cryptographically weak, allowing attackers to feasibly reverse the hash to find the original input, find a different input that creates the same hash, or discover collisions where two inputs produce identical hash values.
A secure cryptographic hash function must be a one-way, deterministic process that reliably produces a unique fixed-length output (digest) from any input. For security, it must prevent three key attacks: recovering the original input from the hash (preimage attack), finding a different input that matches a given hash (second preimage attack), and generating two arbitrary inputs that hash to the same value (birthday attack). A 'weak' hash fails to adequately resist these attacks, often because the math behind it allows methods significantly faster than simple brute-force guessing. Weakness can stem from the algorithm itself (like MD5 or SHA-1, which are now considered broken for many uses) or from improper application. For example, using a cryptographically sound hash without a unique salt for password storage can enable pre-computed rainbow table attacks, effectively breaking the security the hash was meant to provide. The definition of a 'feasible' attack depends on context, but generally includes any method more efficient than brute force.
Auswirkungen in der Praxis

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-328

  • Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) uses a protocol with a cryptographically insecure hashing algorithm for passwords.

  • SHA-1 algorithm is not collision-resistant.

  • DNS product uses a weak hash (CRC32 or SHA-1) of the query name, allowing attacker to forge responses by computing domain names with the same hash.

  • blogging product uses MD5-based algorithm for passwords.

  • forging of certificate signatures using SHA-1 collisions.

  • mobile app for backup sends SHA-1 hash of password in cleartext.

  • Hard-coded hashed values for username and password contained in client-side script, allowing brute-force offline attacks.

Wie Angreifer es ausnutzen

Angreiferpfad Schritt für Schritt

  1. 1

    In both of these examples, a user is logged in if their given password matches a stored password:

  2. 2

    This code relies exclusively on a password mechanism (CWE-309) using only one factor of authentication (CWE-308). If an attacker can steal or guess a user's password, they are given full access to their account. Note this code also uses SHA-1, which is a weak hash (CWE-328). It also does not use a salt (CWE-759).

  3. 3

    In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

  4. 4

    At least one OT product used weak hashes.

  5. 5

    The example code below is taken from the JTAG access control mechanism of the Hack@DAC'21 buggy OpenPiton SoC [REF-1360]. Access to JTAG allows users to access sensitive information in the system. Hence, access to JTAG is controlled using cryptographic authentication of the users. In this example (see the vulnerable code source), the password checker uses HMAC-SHA256 for authentication. It takes a 512-bit secret message from the user, hashes it using HMAC, and compares its output with the expected output to determine the authenticity of the user.

Verwundbares Codebeispiel

Vulnerable C

In both of these examples, a user is logged in if their given password matches a stored password:

Verwundbar C
unsigned char *check_passwd(char *plaintext) {
  	ctext = simple_digest("sha1",plaintext,strlen(plaintext), ... );
```
//Login if hash matches stored hash* 
  	if (equal(ctext, secret_password())) {
  	```
  		login_user();
  	}
  }
Sicheres Codebeispiel

Secure Verilog

To mitigate, remove the zero padding and use all 512 bits of the secret message for HMAC authentication [REF-1361].

Sicher Verilog
...

 **logic [512-1:0] data_d,**  data_q
 logic [512-1:0] pass_data;
 ...

```
   Write: begin
  	 ...
  		 if (pass_mode) begin
```
pass_data = data_d;** 
  			 state_d = PassChk;
  			 pass_mode = 1'b0;
  			 ...
  		 end
   ...
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Präventions-Checkliste

How to prevent CWE-328

  • Architecture and Design Use an adaptive hash function that can be configured to change the amount of computational effort needed to compute the hash, such as the number of iterations ("stretching") or the amount of memory required. Some hash functions perform salting automatically. These functions can significantly increase the overhead for a brute force attack compared to intentionally-fast functions such as MD5. For example, rainbow table attacks can become infeasible due to the high computing overhead. Finally, since computing power gets faster and cheaper over time, the technique can be reconfigured to increase the workload without forcing an entire replacement of the algorithm in use. Some hash functions that have one or more of these desired properties include bcrypt [REF-291], scrypt [REF-292], and PBKDF2 [REF-293]. While there is active debate about which of these is the most effective, they are all stronger than using salts with hash functions with very little computing overhead. Note that using these functions can have an impact on performance, so they require special consideration to avoid denial-of-service attacks. However, their configurability provides finer control over how much CPU and memory is used, so it could be adjusted to suit the environment's needs.
Erkennungssignale

How to detect CWE-328

Automated Static Analysis High

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Plexicus Auto-Fix

Plexicus erkennt CWE-328 automatisch und öffnet in unter 60 Sekunden einen Fix-PR.

Codex Remedium scannt jeden Commit, identifiziert genau diese Schwachstelle und liefert einen reviewer-ready Pull Request mit dem Patch. Keine Tickets. Keine Hand-offs.

Häufig gestellte Fragen

Frequently asked questions

Was ist CWE-328?

This vulnerability occurs when software uses a hashing algorithm that is cryptographically weak, allowing attackers to feasibly reverse the hash to find the original input, find a different input that creates the same hash, or discover collisions where two inputs produce identical hash values.

Wie gravierend ist CWE-328?

MITRE hat für diese Schwachstelle keine Exploit-Wahrscheinlichkeit veröffentlicht. Behandle sie als mittlere Auswirkung, bis dein Threat Model anderes belegt.

Welche Sprachen oder Plattformen sind von CWE-328 betroffen?

MITRE lists the following affected platforms: ICS/OT.

Wie kann ich CWE-328 verhindern?

Use an adaptive hash function that can be configured to change the amount of computational effort needed to compute the hash, such as the number of iterations ("stretching") or the amount of memory required. Some hash functions perform salting automatically. These functions can significantly increase the overhead for a brute force attack compared to intentionally-fast functions such as MD5. For example, rainbow table attacks can become infeasible due to the high computing overhead. Finally,…

Wie erkennt und behebt Plexicus CWE-328?

Die SAST-Engine von Plexicus erkennt die Datenfluss-Signatur von CWE-328 bei jedem Commit. Bei einem Treffer öffnet unser Codex-Remedium-Agent einen Fix-PR mit korrigiertem Code, Tests und einer einzeiligen Zusammenfassung für den Reviewer.

Wo erfahre ich mehr über CWE-328?

MITRE veröffentlicht die kanonische Definition unter https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/328.html. Für ergänzende Hinweise kannst du auch die OWASP- und NIST-Dokumentation heranziehen.

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