CWE-1310 Base Brouillon

Missing Ability to Patch ROM Code

A system or System-on-Chip (SoC) lacks a mechanism to update its initial boot code stored in Read-Only Memory (ROM), permanently exposing devices to unfixable security vulnerabilities.

Définition

What is CWE-1310?

A system or System-on-Chip (SoC) lacks a mechanism to update its initial boot code stored in Read-Only Memory (ROM), permanently exposing devices to unfixable security vulnerabilities.
Many secure systems start by running foundational code from an immutable ROM, which establishes a hardware Root of Trust. Since this ROM code is permanently etched into the chip during manufacturing, any security flaws discovered after the device ships become permanent. This creates a critical, unchangeable weakness in every deployed unit. Without a built-in patching capability for this ROM stage, the entire system remains vulnerable to exploitation. Attackers can target these unfixable flaws to compromise the boot process, potentially bypassing all subsequent security layers and taking full control of the SoC.
Impact réel

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-1310

Aucune référence CVE publique n'est liée à ce CWE dans le catalogue MITRE pour le moment.

Comment les attaquants l'exploitent

Parcours de l'attaquant étape par étape

  1. 1

    A System-on-Chip (SOC) implements a Root-of-Trust (RoT) in ROM to boot secure code. However, at times this ROM code might have security vulnerabilities and need to be patched. Since ROM is immutable, it can be impossible to patch.

  2. 2

    ROM does not have built-in application-programming interfaces (APIs) to patch if the code is vulnerable. Implement mechanisms to patch the vulnerable ROM code.

  3. 3

    The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.

  4. 4

    The above implementation causes the ROM data to be hardcoded for the linux system (rom_rdata_linux) regardless of the value of ariane_boot_sel_i. Therefore, the data (rom_rdata_patch) from the patchable ROM code is never used [REF-1396]. This weakness disables the ROM's ability to be patched. If attackers uncover security vulnerabilities in the ROM, the users must replace the entire device. Otherwise, the weakness exposes the system to a vulnerable state forever. A fix to this issue is to enable rom_rdata to be selected from the patchable rom (rom_rdata_patch) [REF-1397].

Exemple de code vulnérable

Vulnerable Verilog

The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.

Vulnérable Verilog 
...

```
   bootrom i_bootrom_patch (
  	 .clk_i ,
  	 .req_i ( rom_req ),
  	 .addr_i ( rom_addr ),
  	 .rdata_o ( rom_rdata_patch )
   );
   bootrom_linux i_bootrom_linux (
  	 .clk_i ,
  	 .req_i ( rom_req ),
  	 .addr_i ( rom_addr ),
  	 .rdata_o ( rom_rdata_linux )
   );
```
assign rom_rdata = (ariane_boot_sel_i) ? rom_rdata_linux : rom_rdata_linux;** 
 ...
Exemple de code sécurisé

Secure Verilog

The above implementation causes the ROM data to be hardcoded for the linux system (rom_rdata_linux) regardless of the value of ariane_boot_sel_i. Therefore, the data (rom_rdata_patch) from the patchable ROM code is never used [REF-1396]. This weakness disables the ROM's ability to be patched. If attackers uncover security vulnerabilities in the ROM, the users must replace the entire device. Otherwise, the weakness exposes the system to a vulnerable state forever. A fix to this issue is to enable rom_rdata to be selected from the patchable rom (rom_rdata_patch) [REF-1397].

Sécurisé Verilog 
...

```
   bootrom i_bootrom_patch (
  	 .clk_i ,
  	 .req_i ( rom_req ),
  	 .addr_i ( rom_addr ),
  	 .rdata_o ( rom_rdata_patch )
   );
   bootrom_linux i_bootrom_linux (
  	 .clk_i ,
  	 .req_i ( rom_req ),
  	 .addr_i ( rom_addr ),
  	 .rdata_o ( rom_rdata_linux )
   );
```
assign rom_rdata = (ariane_boot_sel_i) ? rom_rdata_patch : rom_rdata_linux;** 
 ...
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Liste de contrôle de prévention

How to prevent CWE-1310

  • Architecture and Design / Implementation Secure patch support to allow ROM code to be patched on the next boot.
  • Architecture and Design / Implementation Support patches that can be programmed in-field or during manufacturing through hardware fuses. This feature can be used for limited patching of devices after shipping, or for the next batch of silicon devices manufactured, without changing the full device ROM.
Signaux de détection

How to detect CWE-1310

SAST High

Exécuter une analyse statique (SAST) sur le code source à la recherche du motif non sécurisé dans le flux de données.

DAST Moderate

Exécuter des tests de sécurité applicative dynamique (DAST) contre le point de terminaison en ligne.

Runtime Moderate

Surveiller les journaux runtime pour détecter des traces d'exception inhabituelles, des entrées malformées ou des tentatives de contournement d'autorisation.

Code review Moderate

Revue de code : signaler tout nouveau code qui traite les entrées de cette surface sans utiliser les helpers du framework validés.

Correction automatique Plexicus

Plexicus détecte automatiquement CWE-1310 et ouvre une PR de correction en moins de 60 secondes.

Codex Remedium analyse chaque commit, identifie cette faiblesse précise et livre une pull request prête à être relue avec le correctif. Pas de tickets. Pas de transferts.

Obtenir une démo Essayer Plexicus gratuitement
Questions fréquentes

Frequently asked questions

Qu'est-ce que CWE-1310 ?

A system or System-on-Chip (SoC) lacks a mechanism to update its initial boot code stored in Read-Only Memory (ROM), permanently exposing devices to unfixable security vulnerabilities.

Quelle est la gravité de CWE-1310 ?

MITRE n'a pas publié de note de probabilité d'exploitation pour cette faiblesse. Traitez-la comme un impact moyen jusqu'à ce que votre modèle de menace prouve le contraire.

Quels langages ou plateformes sont affectés par CWE-1310 ?

MITRE lists the following affected platforms: Not OS-Specific, Not Architecture-Specific, System on Chip.

Comment puis-je prévenir CWE-1310 ?

Secure patch support to allow ROM code to be patched on the next boot. Support patches that can be programmed in-field or during manufacturing through hardware fuses. This feature can be used for limited patching of devices after shipping, or for the next batch of silicon devices manufactured, without changing the full device ROM.

Comment Plexicus détecte et corrige CWE-1310 ?

Le moteur SAST de Plexicus reconnaît la signature de flux de données de CWE-1310 à chaque commit. Lorsqu'une correspondance est trouvée, notre agent Codex Remedium ouvre une PR de correction avec le code corrigé, les tests et un résumé d'une ligne pour le relecteur.

Où puis-je en savoir plus sur CWE-1310 ?

MITRE publie la définition canonique à https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1310.html. Vous pouvez également consulter la documentation OWASP et NIST pour des conseils adjacents.

Faiblesses associées

Weaknesses related to CWE-1310

CWE-1329 Parent

Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable

This vulnerability occurs when a product depends on a component that cannot be updated or patched to fix security flaws or critical bugs.

CWE-1277 Frère

Firmware Not Updateable

This vulnerability occurs when a hardware product lacks a mechanism for users to install firmware updates, leaving known security flaws…

Ressources

Further reading

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