Providing marker flags to send through the interfaces coupled with examination of which users are able to read or manipulate the flags will help verify that the proper isolation has been achieved and is effective.
Improper Isolation of Shared Resources in Network On Chip (NoC)
This vulnerability occurs when a Network on Chip (NoC) fails to properly separate its internal, shared resources—like buffers, switches, and channels—between trusted and untrusted components. This…
What is CWE-1331?
Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-1331
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Improper isolation of shared resource in a network-on-chip leads to denial of service
Parcours de l'attaquant étape par étape
- 1
Consider a NoC that implements a one-dimensional mesh network with four nodes. This supports two flows: Flow A from node 0 to node 3 (via node 1 and node 2) and Flow B from node 1 to node 2. Flows A and B share a common link between Node 1 and Node 2. Only one flow can use the link in each cycle.
- 2
One of the masters to this NoC implements a cryptographic algorithm (RSA), and another master to the NoC is a core that can be exercised by an attacker. The RSA algorithm performs a modulo multiplication of two large numbers and depends on each bit of the secret key. The algorithm examines each bit in the secret key and only performs multiplication if the bit is 1. This algorithm is known to be prone to timing attacks. Whenever RSA performs multiplication, there is additional network traffic to the memory controller. One of the reasons for this is cache conflicts.
- 3
Since this is a one-dimensional mesh, only one flow can use the link in each cycle. Also, packets from the attack program and the RSA program share the output port of the network-on-chip. This contention results in network interference, and the throughput and latency of one flow can be affected by the other flow's demand.
- 4
There may be different ways to fix this particular weakness.
Vulnerable code
Since this is a one-dimensional mesh, only one flow can use the link in each cycle. Also, packets from the attack program and the RSA program share the output port of the network-on-chip. This contention results in network interference, and the throughput and latency of one flow can be affected by the other flow's demand.
The attacker runs a loop program on the core they control, and this causes a cache miss in every iteration for the RSA algorithm. Thus, by observing network-traffic bandwidth and timing, the attack program can determine when the RSA algorithm is doing a multiply operation (i.e., when the secret key bit is 1) and eventually extract the entire, secret key. Since this is a one-dimensional mesh, only one flow can use the link in each cycle. Also, packets from the attack program and the RSA program share the output port of the network-on-chip. This contention results in network interference, and the throughput and latency of one flow can be affected by the other flow's demand.
The attacker runs a loop program on the core they control, and this causes a cache miss in every iteration for the RSA algorithm. Thus, by observing network-traffic bandwidth and timing, the attack program can determine when the RSA algorithm is doing a multiply operation (i.e., when the secret key bit is 1) and eventually extract the entire, secret key. Secure Other
There may be different ways to fix this particular weakness.
Implement priority-based arbitration inside the NoC and have dedicated buffers or virtual channels for routing secret data from trusted agents. How to prevent CWE-1331
- Architecture and Design / Implementation Implement priority-based arbitration inside the NoC and have dedicated buffers or virtual channels for routing secret data from trusted agents.
How to detect CWE-1331
Plexicus détecte automatiquement CWE-1331 et ouvre une PR de correction en moins de 60 secondes.
Codex Remedium analyse chaque commit, identifie cette faiblesse précise et livre une pull request prête à être relue avec le correctif. Pas de tickets. Pas de transferts.
Frequently asked questions
Qu'est-ce que CWE-1331 ?
This vulnerability occurs when a Network on Chip (NoC) fails to properly separate its internal, shared resources—like buffers, switches, and channels—between trusted and untrusted components. This lack of isolation creates a timing side-channel, allowing untrusted agents to potentially infer sensitive data from trusted ones.
Quelle est la gravité de CWE-1331 ?
MITRE n'a pas publié de note de probabilité d'exploitation pour cette faiblesse. Traitez-la comme un impact moyen jusqu'à ce que votre modèle de menace prouve le contraire.
Quels langages ou plateformes sont affectés par CWE-1331 ?
MITRE lists the following affected platforms: Not OS-Specific, Not Architecture-Specific, Security Hardware, Not Technology-Specific.
Comment puis-je prévenir CWE-1331 ?
Implement priority-based arbitration inside the NoC and have dedicated buffers or virtual channels for routing secret data from trusted agents.
Comment Plexicus détecte et corrige CWE-1331 ?
Le moteur SAST de Plexicus reconnaît la signature de flux de données de CWE-1331 à chaque commit. Lorsqu'une correspondance est trouvée, notre agent Codex Remedium ouvre une PR de correction avec le code corrigé, les tests et un résumé d'une ligne pour le relecteur.
Où puis-je en savoir plus sur CWE-1331 ?
MITRE publie la définition canonique à https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1331.html. Vous pouvez également consulter la documentation OWASP et NIST pour des conseils adjacents.
Weaknesses related to CWE-1331
Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization
This vulnerability occurs when an application fails to enforce strong boundaries between components that operate at different security…
Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC)
This vulnerability occurs when a System-on-a-Chip (SoC) fails to properly separate shared hardware resources between secure (trusted) and…
Further reading
- MITRE — CWE-1331 officiel https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1331.html
- SurfNoC: A Low Latency and Provably Non-Interfering Approach to Secure Networks-On-Chip http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~kastner/papers/isca13-surfNOC.pdf
- Network on a chip https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_on_a_chip
- A Survey of Network-on-Chip Security Attacks and Countermeasures https://dl.acm.org/doi/fullHtml/10.1145/3450964
- Design of Secure and Trustworthy Network-on-chip Architectures https://www.cise.ufl.edu/research/cad/Publications/charlesThesis.pdf
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