Process Control
Incomplete Class
Structure: Simple
Description
Process Control vulnerabilities occur when an application executes commands or loads libraries from an untrusted source or environment, allowing an attacker to run malicious code.
This flaw typically manifests in two ways. First, an attacker can directly control the command string itself, often by injecting malicious input that gets passed to a system shell or execution function. Second, an attacker can manipulate the environment in which the command runs—such as the PATH variable or library search order—to change the meaning of a seemingly safe command, causing the application to load a malicious binary or script. Effectively managing this risk requires validating and sanitizing all external inputs used in execution contexts and hardening the application's runtime environment. While SAST tools can detect dangerous patterns, Plexicus uses AI to analyze your codebase and provide specific, automated remediation suggestions, helping you fix these critical security gaps efficiently across your entire application portfolio.
Common Consequences 1
Scope: ConfidentialityIntegrityAvailability
Impact: Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands
Detection Methods 1
Automated Static AnalysisHigh
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)Potential Mitigations 1
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Libraries that are loaded should be well understood and come from a trusted source. The application can execute code contained in the native libraries, which often contain calls that are susceptible to other security problems, such as buffer overflows or command injection. All native libraries should be validated to determine if the application requires the use of the library. It is very difficult to determine what these native libraries actually do, and the potential for malicious code is high. In addition, the potential for an inadvertent mistake in these native libraries is also high, as many are written in C or C++ and may be susceptible to buffer overflow or race condition problems. To help prevent buffer overflow attacks, validate all input to native calls for content and length. If the native library does not come from a trusted source, review the source code of the library. The library should be built from the reviewed source before using it.
Demonstrative Examples 3
The following code uses System.loadLibrary() to load code from a native library named library.dll, which is normally found in a standard system directory.
Code Example:
Bad
Java
javaThe problem here is that System.loadLibrary() accepts a library name, not a path, for the library to be loaded. From the Java 1.4.2 API documentation this function behaves as follows [1]: A file containing native code is loaded from the local file system from a place where library files are conventionally obtained. The details of this process are implementation-dependent. The mapping from a library name to a specific filename is done in a system-specific manner. If an attacker is able to place a malicious copy of library.dll higher in the search order than file the application intends to load, then the application will load the malicious copy instead of the intended file. Because of the nature of the application, it runs with elevated privileges, which means the contents of the attacker's library.dll will now be run with elevated privileges, possibly giving them complete control of the system.
The following code from a privileged application uses a registry entry to determine the directory in which it is installed and loads a library file based on a relative path from the specified directory.
Code Example:
Bad
C
cThe code in this example allows an attacker to load an arbitrary library, from which code will be executed with the elevated privilege of the application, by modifying a registry key to specify a different path containing a malicious version of INITLIB. Because the program does not validate the value read from the environment, if an attacker can control the value of APPHOME, they can fool the application into running malicious code.
The following code is from a web-based administration utility that allows users access to an interface through which they can update their profile on the system. The utility makes use of a library named liberty.dll, which is normally found in a standard system directory.
Code Example:
Bad
C
cThe problem is that the program does not specify an absolute path for liberty.dll. If an attacker is able to place a malicious library named liberty.dll higher in the search order than file the application intends to load, then the application will load the malicious copy instead of the intended file. Because of the nature of the application, it runs with elevated privileges, which means the contents of the attacker's liberty.dll will now be run with elevated privileges, possibly giving the attacker complete control of the system. The type of attack seen in this example is made possible because of the search order used by LoadLibrary() when an absolute path is not specified. If the current directory is searched before system directories, as was the case up until the most recent versions of Windows, then this type of attack becomes trivial if the attacker can execute the program locally. The search order is operating system version dependent, and is controlled on newer operating systems by the value of the registry key: HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDllSearchMode
References 1
Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors
Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess, and Gary McGraw
NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics • NIST
07-11-2005
ID: REF-6
Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Implementation
Related Attack Patterns
Functional Areas
- Program Invocation
Affected Resources
- System Process
Related Weaknesses
Taxonomy Mapping
- 7 Pernicious Kingdoms
Notes
MaintenanceProcess Control is a Class, but it is listed a child of External Control of File Name or Path in view 1000. This suggests some abstraction problems that should be resolved in future versions.
MaintenanceThis entry seems more attack-oriented, or organized around common legitimate behaviors (process invocation) instead of the mistakes in those behaviors. There is likely too much overlap with other CWEs including External Control of File Name or Path, Untrusted Search Path, Uncontrolled Search Path Element, or other weaknesses related to process invocation.