DMA Device Enabled Too Early in Boot Phase

Draft Base
Structure: Simple
Description

This vulnerability occurs when a device with Direct Memory Access (DMA) capability is activated before the system's security settings are fully locked in during the boot process. This oversight can let an attacker bypass normal protections to read sensitive data from memory or escalate their privileges on the system.

Extended Description

DMA allows hardware devices to transfer data directly to and from the system's main memory, bypassing the operating system for speed. While useful for performance, this creates a major security risk if an untrusted device is granted this powerful access before security measures like Input-Output Memory Management Units (IOMMUs) or similar virtualization-based protections are enabled. An attacker with physical or compromised peripheral access could exploit this early window to launch a DMA attack and steal secrets like encryption keys or passwords. This issue is particularly relevant for 'early boot' IPs—hardware components that are powered up and initialized before the boot sequence finishes. If these components have DMA capability and are not considered trusted, they become a potent attack vector. To prevent this, system designers must ensure that all DMA-capable devices are either inherently trusted or that their DMA functionality remains disabled until after the core security configuration and isolation policies are fully established during boot.

Common Consequences 1
Scope: Access Control

Impact: Bypass Protection MechanismModify Memory

DMA devices have direct write access to main memory and due to time of attack will be able to bypass OS or Bootloader access control.

Potential Mitigations 1
Phase: Architecture and Design
Utilize an IOMMU to orchestrate IO access from the start of the boot process.
References 7
DMA attack
19-10-2019
ID: REF-1038
Thunderclap: Exploring Vulnerabilities in Operating System IOMMU Protection via DMA from Untrustworthy Peripherals
A. Theodore Markettos, Colin Rothwell, Brett F. Gutstein, Allison Pearce, Peter G. Neumann, Simon W. Moore, and Robert N. M. Watson
25-02-2019
ID: REF-1039
FireWire all your memory are belong to us
Maximillian Dornseif, Michael Becher, and Christian N. Klein
2005
ID: REF-1040
Integrating DMA attacks in exploitation frameworks
Rory Breuk, Albert Spruyt, and Adam Boileau
20-02-2012
ID: REF-1041
Owned by an iPod
Maximillian Dornseif
2004
ID: REF-1042
My aimful life
Dmytro Oleksiuk
12-09-2015
ID: REF-1044
Hit by a Bus:Physical Access Attacks with Firewire
A. Theodore Markettos and Adam Boileau
2006
ID: REF-1046
Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Technologies:
System on Chip : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Architecture and Design
Related Weaknesses