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Generation of Incorrect Security Tokens

Incomplete Base
Structure: Simple
Description

This vulnerability occurs when a system's security token mechanism, designed to control permissions for different entities or agents, generates tokens that are fundamentally flawed or incorrect.

Extended Description

In Systems-on-a-Chip (SoC) and similar hardware, security tokens act as digital IDs that define what actions (like read, write, or reset) each hardware agent is allowed to perform. These tokens are assigned based on an agent's trust level. If the token generation logic is broken, it can assign duplicate tokens to multiple agents or assign multiple conflicting tokens to a single agent. This flawed assignment breaks the fundamental security model. It can lead to severe consequences, including system crashes (Denial-of-Service), privilege escalation where a low-trust agent gains high-level access, or unauthorized actions that compromise the entire chip's security and data integrity.
Common Consequences 1
Scope: ConfidentialityIntegrityAvailabilityAccess Control

Impact: Modify Files or DirectoriesExecute Unauthorized Code or CommandsBypass Protection MechanismGain Privileges or Assume IdentityRead MemoryModify MemoryDoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart
Potential Mitigations 1
Phase: Architecture and DesignImplementation
- Generation of Security Tokens should be reviewed for design inconsistency and common weaknesses. - Security-Token definition and programming flow should be tested in pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.
Demonstrative Examples 1
Consider a system with a register for storing an AES key for encryption or decryption. The key is 128 bits long implemented as a set of four 32-bit registers. The key registers are assets, and register, AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY, is defined to provide necessary access controls. The access-policy register defines which agents, using a Security Token, may access the AES-key registers. Each bit in this 32-bit register is used to define a Security Token. There could be a maximum of 32 Security Tokens that are allowed access to the AES-key registers. When set (bit = "1") bit number allows action from an agent whose identity matches that bit number. If Clear (bit = "0") the action is disallowed for the corresponding agent.
Assume the system has two agents: a Main-controller and an Aux-controller. The respective Security Tokens are "1" and "2". | Register | Description | Default | | --- | --- | --- | | AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_0 | AES key [0:31] for encryption or decryption | 0x00000000 | | AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_1 | AES key [32:63] for encryption or decryption | 0x00000000 | | AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_2 | AES key [64:95] for encryption or decryption | 0x00000000 | | AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_3 | AES key [96:127] for encryption or decryption | 0x00000000 | | AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY | AES key access register [31:0] | 0x00000002 |
An agent with a Security Token "1" has access to AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_0 through AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_3 registers. As per the above access policy, the AES-Key-access policy allows access to the AES-key registers if the security Token is "1".

Code Example:

Bad
Other

The SoC incorrectly generates Security Token "1" for every agent. In other words, both Main-controller and Aux-controller are assigned Security Token "1".

Both agents have access to the AES-key registers.

Code Example:

Good
Other

The SoC should correctly generate Security Tokens, assigning "1" to the Main-controller and "2" to the Aux-controller
Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Technologies:
Not Technology-Specific : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Related Attack Patterns
Related Weaknesses
ChildOf: Improper Access Control (CWE-284)
ChildOf: Insecure Security Identifier Mechanism (CWE-1294)