Missing Origin Validation in WebSockets

Incomplete Variant
Structure: Simple
Description

This vulnerability occurs when a WebSocket connection is established without verifying the origin of incoming messages, allowing potentially malicious data from untrusted sources.

Extended Description

WebSockets enable persistent, two-way communication between a client and server, which is ideal for real-time features. Unlike standard HTTP requests, these connections stay open and are not automatically restricted by browser security policies like the Same-Origin Policy (SOP) or Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS). This means a WebSocket can receive messages from any origin unless the server explicitly validates where the connection is coming from. Without proper origin checks, attackers can exploit these open channels to launch powerful Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks or send malicious data. To prevent this, developers must implement server-side validation for every WebSocket connection request, ensuring it originates from a trusted and expected domain before allowing communication to proceed.

Common Consequences 1
Scope: ConfidentialityIntegrityAvailabilityNon-RepudiationAccess Control

Impact: Varies by ContextGain Privileges or Assume IdentityBypass Protection MechanismRead Application DataModify Application DataDoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

The consequences will vary depending on the nature of the functionality that is vulnerable to CSRF. An attacker could effectively perform any operations as the victim. If the victim is an administrator or privileged user, the consequences may include obtaining complete control over the web application - deleting or stealing data, uninstalling the product, or using it to launch other attacks against all of the product's users. Because the attacker has the identity of the victim, the scope of the CSRF is limited only by the victim's privileges.

Potential Mitigations 7
Phase: Implementation
Enable CORS-like access restrictions by verifying the 'Origin' header during the WebSocket handshake.
Phase: Implementation
Use a randomized CSRF token to verify requests.
Phase: Implementation
Use TLS to securely communicate using 'wss' (WebSocket Secure) instead of 'ws'.
Phase: Architecture and DesignImplementation
Require user authentication prior to the WebSocket connection being established. For example, the WS library in Node has a 'verifyClient' function.
Phase: Implementation
Leverage rate limiting to prevent against DoS. Use of the leaky bucket algorithm can help with this.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Phase: Implementation
Use a library that provides restriction of the payload size. For example, WS library for Node includes 'maxPayloadoption' that can be set.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Phase: Implementation
Treat data/input as untrusted in both directions and apply the same data/input sanitization as XSS, SQLi, etc.
Observed Examples 5
CVE-2020-25095web console for SIEM product does not check Origin header, allowing Cross Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWH)
CVE-2018-6651Chain: gaming client attempts to validate the Origin header, but only uses a substring, allowing Cross-Site WebSocket hijacking by forcing requests from an origin whose hostname is a substring of the valid origin.
CVE-2018-14730WebSocket server does not check the origin of requests, allowing attackers to steal developer's code using a ws://127.0.0.1:3123/ connection.
CVE-2018-14731WebSocket server does not check the origin of requests, allowing attackers to steal developer's code using a ws://127.0.0.1/ connection to a randomized port number.
CVE-2018-14732WebSocket server does not check the origin of requests, allowing attackers to steal developer's code using a ws://127.0.0.1:8080/ connection.
References 5
Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH)
Christian Schneider
01-09-2013
ID: REF-1257
WebSockets not Bound by SOP and CORS? Does this mean...
Drew Branch
06-06-2018
ID: REF-1251
How to secure your WebSocket connections
Mehul Mohan
12-11-2018
ID: REF-1252
Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH)
Vickie Li
27-11-2019
ID: REF-1256
Testing for WebSockets security vulnerabilities
PortSwigger
ID: REF-1253
Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Technologies:
Web Server : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Alternate Terms

Cross-Site WebSocket hijacking (CSWSH)

this term is used for attacks that exploit this weakness
Related Weaknesses