Improper Neutralization of Record Delimiters

Draft Variant
Structure: Simple
Description

This vulnerability occurs when an application fails to properly sanitize or escape special characters that function as record separators in data streams. When untrusted input containing these delimiters is passed to a downstream system, it can corrupt data structures, cause misinterpretation of records, or trigger unauthorized actions.

Extended Description

Imagine your application accepts user input—like a form field for a name or address—and later packages that data into a structured format like a CSV file, a log entry, or a protocol message. If an attacker submits input containing a record delimiter (such as a newline, pipe character, or custom separator), and your code doesn't neutralize it, that input can break the expected record boundaries. The downstream parser, whether it's a database, a reporting tool, or another service, will then misinterpret where one record ends and the next begins, leading to data corruption, injection of false records, or logic errors. In practice, this flaw allows data to escape its intended context. For example, a single input field could be parsed as multiple separate records, or critical delimiters could be missing, causing entire records to be merged or skipped. To prevent this, you must always validate and sanitize input by escaping or removing delimiter characters based on the specific data format and context before processing or transmitting the data.

Common Consequences 1
Scope: Integrity

Impact: Unexpected State

Potential Mitigations 4
Developers should anticipate that record delimiters will be injected/removed/manipulated in the input vectors of their product. Use an appropriate combination of denylists and allowlists to ensure only valid, expected and appropriate input is processed by the system.
Phase: Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Phase: Implementation

Strategy: Output Encoding

While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')).
Phase: Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (Double Decoding of the Same Data). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
Observed Examples 2
CVE-2004-1982Carriage returns in subject field allow adding new records to data file.
CVE-2001-0527Attacker inserts carriage returns and "|" field separator characters to add new user/privileges.
References 1
The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, and Justin Schuh
Addison Wesley
2006
ID: REF-62
Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Implementation
Taxonomy Mapping
  • PLOVER
  • Software Fault Patterns