CWE-187 Variant Incomplete

Partial String Comparison

This weakness occurs when software checks only part of a string or token to determine a match, instead of comparing the entire value. This incomplete validation can lead to incorrect security…

Definition

What is CWE-187?

This weakness occurs when software checks only part of a string or token to determine a match, instead of comparing the entire value. This incomplete validation can lead to incorrect security decisions.
Partial string comparison happens when a system, such as an authentication module, validates only the first few characters of an input against a stored value. For example, if a password check only verifies the initial 5 characters, an attacker could gain access by providing any password that starts with those same 5 characters, regardless of the full correct password. This flaw fundamentally undermines security logic by treating partially matching inputs as fully authorized. Developers should always enforce complete, exact-string comparisons for security-critical operations like authentication, authorization tokens, or integrity checks to prevent attackers from exploiting these predictable shortcuts.
Real-world impact

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-187

  • Product does not prevent access to restricted directories due to partial string comparison with a public directory

  • Argument parser of an IMAP server treats a partial command "body[p" as if it is "body.peek", leading to index error and out-of-bounds corruption.

  • Web browser only checks the hostname portion of a certificate when the hostname portion of the URI is not a fully qualified domain name (FQDN), which allows remote attackers to spoof trusted certificates.

  • One-character password by attacker checks only against first character of real password.

  • One-character password by attacker checks only against first character of real password.

How attackers exploit it

Step-by-step attacker path

  1. 1

    This example defines a fixed username and password. The AuthenticateUser() function is intended to accept a username and a password from an untrusted user, and check to ensure that it matches the username and password. If the username and password match, AuthenticateUser() is intended to indicate that authentication succeeded.

  2. 2

    In AuthenticateUser(), the strncmp() call uses the string length of an attacker-provided inPass parameter in order to determine how many characters to check in the password. So, if the attacker only provides a password of length 1, the check will only examine the first byte of the application's password before determining success.

  3. 3

    As a result, this partial comparison leads to improper authentication (CWE-287).

  4. 4

    Any of these passwords would still cause authentication to succeed for the "admin" user:

  5. 5

    This significantly reduces the search space for an attacker, making brute force attacks more feasible.

Vulnerable code example

Vulnerable C

This example defines a fixed username and password. The AuthenticateUser() function is intended to accept a username and a password from an untrusted user, and check to ensure that it matches the username and password. If the username and password match, AuthenticateUser() is intended to indicate that authentication succeeded.

Vulnerable C
```
/* Ignore CWE-259 (hard-coded password) and CWE-309 (use of password system for authentication) for this example. */* 
  
  char *username = "admin";
  char *pass = "password";
  
  int AuthenticateUser(char *inUser, char *inPass) {
  ```
  	if (strncmp(username, inUser, strlen(inUser))) {
  		logEvent("Auth failure of username using strlen of inUser");
  		return(AUTH_FAIL);
  	}
  	if (! strncmp(pass, inPass, strlen(inPass))) {
  		logEvent("Auth success of password using strlen of inUser");
  		return(AUTH_SUCCESS);
  	}
  	else {
  		logEvent("Auth fail of password using sizeof");
  		return(AUTH_FAIL);
  	}
  }
  int main (int argc, char **argv) {
  		int authResult;
  		if (argc < 3) {
  			ExitError("Usage: Provide a username and password");
  		}
  		authResult = AuthenticateUser(argv[1], argv[2]);
  		if (authResult == AUTH_SUCCESS) {
  			DoAuthenticatedTask(argv[1]);
  		}
  		else {
  			ExitError("Authentication failed");
  		}
  }
Attacker payload

Any of these passwords would still cause authentication to succeed for the "admin" user:

Attacker payload
p
  pa
  pas
  pass
Secure code example

Secure pseudo

Secure pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
  const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
  return executeWithGuards(safe);
}
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Prevention checklist

How to prevent CWE-187

  • Testing Thoroughly test the comparison scheme before deploying code into production. Perform positive testing as well as negative testing.
Detection signals

How to detect CWE-187

SAST High

Run static analysis (SAST) on the codebase looking for the unsafe pattern in the data flow.

DAST Moderate

Run dynamic application security testing against the live endpoint.

Runtime Moderate

Watch runtime logs for unusual exception traces, malformed input, or authorization bypass attempts.

Code review Moderate

Code review: flag any new code that handles input from this surface without using the validated framework helpers.

CWE-187

Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.

Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.

Frequently asked questions

Frequently asked questions

What is CWE-187?

This weakness occurs when software checks only part of a string or token to determine a match, instead of comparing the entire value. This incomplete validation can lead to incorrect security decisions.

How serious is CWE-187?

MITRE has not published a likelihood-of-exploit rating for this weakness. Treat it as medium-impact until your threat model proves otherwise.

What languages or platforms are affected by CWE-187?

MITRE has not specified affected platforms for this CWE — it can apply across most application stacks.

How can I prevent CWE-187?

Thoroughly test the comparison scheme before deploying code into production. Perform positive testing as well as negative testing.

How does Plexicus detect and fix CWE-187?

Plexicus's SAST engine matches the data-flow signature for CWE-187 on every commit. When a match is found, our Codex Remedium agent opens a fix PR with the corrected code, tests, and a one-line summary for the reviewer.

Where can I learn more about CWE-187?

MITRE publishes the canonical definition at https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/187.html. You can also reference OWASP and NIST documentation for adjacent guidance.

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SAMPLE HANDOVER · ILLUSTRATIVE

Sample evidence handover

A trimmed view of what your team receives at the end of an AI Swarm Pentest engagement. Real engagements include full technical evidence, executive narrative, and a remediation plan.

VALIDATED FINDING Evidence attached

Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks/receiver

demo-project/sample-app · src/webhooks/receiver.py:42

SeverityHigh CVSS 3.18.6 Priority79 Confirmedvia replay

Untrusted caller-supplied URLs reach an internal egress without an allowlist. Replayed in a sandbox against a fresh authorised target — the same control was validated to fail twice.

REVIEWER-READY REMEDIATION Merge-ready PR

Validate the target URL against an allowlist of permitted hostnames. Reject private/internal IP ranges. Enforce HTTPS only.

plexicus/remediation/webhooks-ssrf 3 changed · 0 new files
42resp = requests.get(target_url)
42+if not is_allowed_host(target_url):
43+  raise WebhookRejected(target_url)
44+resp = requests.get(target_url, timeout=5)
Every engagement hands over:
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  • Validated findings list
  • Merge-ready PRs
  • Compliance mapping (NIS2 · DORA · CRA)