Creation of chroot Jail Without Changing Working Directory

Draft Variant
Structure: Simple
Description

This vulnerability occurs when a program creates a chroot jail but fails to change its current working directory afterward. Because the process's working directory remains outside the jail, attackers can use relative paths to access files and directories that should be restricted.

Extended Description

The chroot() system call isolates a process within a specific directory subtree, known as a jail. However, a critical step is often missed: chroot() does not automatically change the process's current working directory. If the working directory remains outside the new root, any relative path operations (like opening '../etc/passwd') can still traverse the original filesystem, completely bypassing the intended isolation. To properly secure the jail, you must immediately call chdir('/') after chroot(). This changes the working directory to be inside the new root, ensuring all subsequent relative path references are confined. Without this step, the chroot jail provides a false sense of security and is trivial for an attacker to escape.

Common Consequences 1
Scope: Confidentiality

Impact: Read Files or Directories

Detection Methods 1
Automated Static AnalysisHigh
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Demonstrative Examples 1
Consider the following source code from a (hypothetical) FTP server:

Code Example:

Bad
C
c
This code is responsible for reading a filename from the network, opening the corresponding file on the local machine, and sending the contents over the network. This code could be used to implement the FTP GET command. The FTP server calls chroot() in its initialization routines in an attempt to prevent access to files outside of /var/ftproot. But because the server does not change the current working directory by calling chdir("/"), an attacker could request the file "../../../../../etc/passwd" and obtain a copy of the system password file.
References 1
Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors
Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess, and Gary McGraw
NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and MetricsNIST
07-11-2005
ID: REF-6
Likelihood of Exploit

High

Applicable Platforms
Languages:
C : UndeterminedC++ : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Implementation
Affected Resources
  1. File or Directory
Taxonomy Mapping
  • 7 Pernicious Kingdoms
  • Software Fault Patterns