Use of Hard-coded Password
Draft Variant
Structure: Simple
Description
This vulnerability occurs when an application embeds a password directly into its source code or configuration files. This hard-coded secret is then used either to authenticate incoming users or to connect to external services and databases.
Hard-coded passwords create two major security risks. First, for inbound authentication, anyone with access to the code can discover the password and gain unauthorized access. Second, for outbound connections, the embedded credentials for databases, APIs, or other services cannot be changed without modifying and redeploying the application, making rotation and management nearly impossible. Both scenarios bypass standard secret management and leave the system permanently exposed if the code is ever leaked or shared. To fix this, always store passwords, API keys, and other secrets in secure, external management systems like environment variables, vaults, or dedicated secret managers. This allows for secure access control, auditing, and easy rotation without code changes. While SAST tools can detect the hard-coded pattern, Plexicus uses AI to analyze the context and suggest the correct remediation—such as replacing the static string with a secure fetch from a vault—saving developers hours of manual refactoring and reducing the risk of misconfiguration.
Common Consequences 2
Scope: Access Control
Impact: Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
If hard-coded passwords are used, it is almost certain that malicious users can gain access through the account in question.
Scope: Access Control
Impact: Gain Privileges or Assume IdentityHide ActivitiesReduce Maintainability
A hard-coded password typically leads to a significant authentication failure that can be difficult for the system administrator to detect. Once detected, it can be difficult to fix, so the administrator may be forced into disabling the product entirely.
Detection Methods 3
Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.Black Box
Use monitoring tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.
Attach the monitor to the process and perform a login. Using disassembled code, look at the associated instructions and see if any of them appear to be comparing the input to a fixed string or value.
Automated Static AnalysisHigh
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)Potential Mitigations 5
Phase: Architecture and Design
For outbound authentication: store passwords outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (Key Management Errors). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible.
Phase: Architecture and Design
For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Perform access control checks and limit which entities can access the feature that requires the hard-coded password. For example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console instead of through a network connection.
Phase: Architecture and Design
For inbound authentication: apply strong one-way hashes to your passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When receiving an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the hash that you have saved.
Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that you generate. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.
Phase: Architecture and Design
For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete.
```
The first suggestion involves the use of generated passwords which are changed automatically and must be entered at given time intervals by a system administrator. These passwords will be held in memory and only be valid for the time intervals.
Next, the passwords used should be limited at the back end to only performing actions valid for the front end, as opposed to having full access.
Finally, the messages sent should be tagged and checksummed with time sensitive values so as to prevent replay style attacks.
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Demonstrative Examples 4
ID : DX-13
The following code uses a hard-coded password to connect to a database:Code Example:
Bad
Java
javaThis is an example of an external hard-coded password on the client-side of a connection. This code will run successfully, but anyone who has access to it will have access to the password. Once the program has shipped, there is no going back from the database user "scott" with a password of "tiger" unless the program is patched. A devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system. Even worse, if attackers have access to the bytecode for application, they can use the javap -c command to access the disassembled code, which will contain the values of the passwords used. The result of this operation might look something like the following for the example above:
Code Example:
Attack
bashID : DX-14
The following code is an example of an internal hard-coded password in the back-end:Code Example:
Bad
C
cCode Example:
Bad
Java
javaEvery instance of this program can be placed into diagnostic mode with the same password. Even worse is the fact that if this program is distributed as a binary-only distribution, it is very difficult to change that password or disable this "functionality."
ID : DX-43
The following examples show a portion of properties and configuration files for Java and ASP.NET applications. The files include username and password information but they are stored in cleartext.This Java example shows a properties file with a cleartext username / password pair.
Code Example:
Bad
Java
Java Web App ResourceBundle properties file*
javaThe following example shows a portion of a configuration file for an ASP.Net application. This configuration file includes username and password information for a connection to a database but the pair is stored in cleartext.
Code Example:
Bad
ASP.NET
asp.netUsername and password information should not be included in a configuration file or a properties file in cleartext as this will allow anyone who can read the file access to the resource. If possible, encrypt this information.
ID : DX-153
In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.Multiple vendors used hard-coded credentials in their OT products.
Observed Examples 3
CVE-2022-29964Distributed Control System (DCS) has hard-coded passwords for local shell access
CVE-2021-37555Telnet service for IoT feeder for dogs and cats has hard-coded password [REF-1288]
CVE-2021-35033Firmware for a WiFi router uses a hard-coded password for a BusyBox shell, allowing bypass of authentication through the UART port
References 5
Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors
Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess, and Gary McGraw
NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics • NIST
07-11-2005
ID: REF-6
24 Deadly Sins of Software Security
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, and John Viega
McGraw-Hill
2010
ID: REF-44
OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management
Forescout Vedere Labs
20-06-2022
ID: REF-1283
Ethical hacking of a Smart Automatic Feed Dispenser
Julia Lokrantz
07-06-2021
ID: REF-1288
ICS Alert (ICS-ALERT-13-164-01): Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords
ICS-CERT
13-06-2013
ID: REF-1304
Likelihood of Exploit
High
Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Technologies:
ICS/OT : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Implementation
Architecture and Design
Related Weaknesses
Taxonomy Mapping
- 7 Pernicious Kingdoms
- CLASP
- OWASP Top Ten 2004
- The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011)
- Software Fault Patterns
Notes
MaintenanceIt might be appropriate to split this entry into an inbound variant and an outbound variant. These variants are likely to have different consequences, detectability, etc., although such differences are not suitable for a split. More importantly, from a vulnerability theory perspective, they might be characterized as different behaviors. The difference is in where the hard-coded password is stored - on the component performing the authentication, or the component that is connecting to the external component that requires authentication. However, as with many weaknesses, the "vulnerability topology" should not be regarded as important enough for splits. For example, separate weaknesses do not exist for client-to-server buffer overflows versus server-to-client buffer overflows.
Other
In the Inbound variant, a default administration account may be created, and a simple password is hard-coded into the product and associated with that account. This hard-coded password is the same for each installation of the product, and it usually cannot be changed or disabled by system administrators without manually modifying the program, or otherwise patching the product. If the password is ever discovered or published (a common occurrence on the Internet), then anybody with knowledge of this password can access the product. Finally, since all installations of the product will have the same password, even across different organizations, this enables massive attacks such as worms to take place.
The Outbound variant can apply to front-end systems that authenticate with a back-end service. The back-end service may require a fixed password that can be discovered easily. The programmer may simply hard-code those back-end credentials into the front-end product. Any user of that program may be able to extract the password. Client-side systems with hard-coded passwords pose even more of a threat, since the extraction of a password from a binary is usually very simple.