Key Exchange without Entity Authentication

Draft Base
Structure: Simple
Description

This vulnerability occurs when a system establishes a cryptographic key with another party without first confirming that party's true identity.

Extended Description

While a key exchange can encrypt the communication channel between two systems, it does not automatically verify who is on the other end. If you skip the authentication step, you might be securely talking to an imposter. This is like having a perfectly sealed, private conversation with someone who is pretending to be your bank—the privacy is intact, but you've trusted the wrong entity. In a typical attack, a client application mistakenly connects to a malicious server masquerading as a trusted one. If the client proceeds without checking the server's credentials, the fake server can steal user login details, intercept sensitive data, or relay information to the real server while monitoring the entire session. The attacker essentially sits in the middle, with both parties unaware their secure channel has been compromised from the start.

Common Consequences 2
Scope: Access Control

Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism

No authentication takes place in this process, bypassing an assumed protection of encryption.

Scope: Confidentiality

Impact: Read Application Data

The encrypted communication between a user and a trusted host may be subject to sniffing by any actor in the communication path.

Potential Mitigations 2
Phase: Architecture and Design
Ensure that proper authentication is included in the system design.
Phase: Implementation
Understand and properly implement all checks necessary to ensure the identity of entities involved in encrypted communications.
Demonstrative Examples 1
Many systems have used Diffie-Hellman key exchange without authenticating the entities exchanging keys, allowing attackers to influence communications by redirecting or interfering with the communication path. Many people using SSL/TLS skip the authentication (often unknowingly).
References 3
The CLASP Application Security Process
Secure Software, Inc.
2005
ID: REF-18
24 Deadly Sins of Software Security
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, and John Viega
McGraw-Hill
2010
ID: REF-44
The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, and Justin Schuh
Addison Wesley
2006
ID: REF-62
Likelihood of Exploit

High

Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Architecture and Design
Taxonomy Mapping
  • CLASP