This vulnerability occurs when a program creates a temporary file but sets its file permissions too loosely, allowing other users or processes on the system to read, modify, or delete the file.
When a temporary file is created with insecure permissions (like world-readable or world-writable), it becomes an easy target for attackers on the same system. They can directly read sensitive data from the file, inject malicious content into it, or even delete it to cause a denial of service. This is especially dangerous because developers often assume temporary files are private and secure, leading them to store sensitive information like session tokens, passwords, or configuration data in them. To prevent this, always use secure APIs designed for temporary file creation that enforce strict permissions by default, such as `mkstemp` on Unix-like systems. If you must use a lower-level function, explicitly set restrictive file permissions immediately after creation. Additionally, consider using alternative, more secure storage methods like memory-based structures for highly sensitive data, and ensure proper file cleanup to reduce the attack window.
Impact: Read Application Data
If the temporary file can be read by the attacker, sensitive information may be in that file which could be revealed.
Impact: Other
If that file can be written to by the attacker, the file might be moved into a place to which the attacker does not have access. This will allow the attacker to gain selective resource access-control privileges.
Impact: Other
Depending on the data stored in the temporary file, there is the potential for an attacker to gain an additional input vector which is trusted as non-malicious. It may be possible to make arbitrary changes to data structures, user information, or even process ownership.
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// write data to tmp file* ... // remove tmp file rmtmp();
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