CWE-379 Base Incomplete Low likelihood

Creation of Temporary File in Directory with Insecure Permissions

This vulnerability occurs when an application creates a temporary file in a directory that is too permissive, allowing unauthorized users or processes to see, access, or manipulate the file.

Definition

What is CWE-379?

This vulnerability occurs when an application creates a temporary file in a directory that is too permissive, allowing unauthorized users or processes to see, access, or manipulate the file.
When a temporary file is placed in a directory with loose permissions (like world-readable or world-writable), other users or system actors can detect its presence. This simple act of discovery reveals which application created the file, offering a window into what the user is currently doing. Attackers can correlate this information with running processes to infer sensitive user activity, turning a seemingly minor information leak into a serious privacy breach. This issue is more than just a file access problem; it's an information exposure flaw that can enable targeted attacks. By knowing which application is in use, an attacker gains critical context to craft further exploits, potentially escalating privileges or accessing confidential data. Developers must ensure temporary files are created in secure, private locations with strict access controls to prevent this form of reconnaissance.
Real-world impact

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-379

  • A hotkey daemon written in Rust creates a domain socket file underneath /tmp, which is accessible by any user.

  • A Java-based application for a rapid-development framework uses File.createTempFile() to create a random temporary file with insecure default permissions.

How attackers exploit it

Step-by-step attacker path

  1. 1

    In the following code examples a temporary file is created and written to. After using the temporary file, the file is closed and deleted from the file system.

  2. 2

    However, within this C/C++ code the method tmpfile() is used to create and open the temp file. The tmpfile() method works the same way as the fopen() method would with read/write permission, allowing attackers to read potentially sensitive information contained in the temp file or modify the contents of the file.

  3. 3

    Similarly, the createTempFile() method used in the Java code creates a temp file that may be readable and writable to all users.

  4. 4

    Additionally both methods used above place the file into a default directory. On UNIX systems the default directory is usually "/tmp" or "/var/tmp" and on Windows systems the default directory is usually "C:\\Windows\\Temp", which may be easily accessible to attackers, possibly enabling them to read and modify the contents of the temp file.

Vulnerable code example

Vulnerable C

In the following code examples a temporary file is created and written to. After using the temporary file, the file is closed and deleted from the file system.

Vulnerable C
FILE *stream;
  if( (stream = tmpfile()) == NULL ) {
  		perror("Could not open new temporary file\n");
  		return (-1);
  }
```
// write data to tmp file* 
  ...
  // remove tmp file
  rmtmp();
Secure code example

Secure pseudo

Secure pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
  const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
  return executeWithGuards(safe);
}
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Prevention checklist

How to prevent CWE-379

  • Requirements Many contemporary languages have functions which properly handle this condition. Older C temp file functions are especially susceptible.
  • Implementation Try to store sensitive tempfiles in a directory which is not world readable -- i.e., per-user directories.
  • Implementation Avoid using vulnerable temp file functions.
Detection signals

How to detect CWE-379

Automated Static Analysis High

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

CWE-379

Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.

Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.

Frequently asked questions

Frequently asked questions

What is CWE-379?

This vulnerability occurs when an application creates a temporary file in a directory that is too permissive, allowing unauthorized users or processes to see, access, or manipulate the file.

How serious is CWE-379?

MITRE rates the likelihood of exploit as Low — exploitation is uncommon, but the weakness should still be fixed when discovered.

What languages or platforms are affected by CWE-379?

MITRE has not specified affected platforms for this CWE — it can apply across most application stacks.

How can I prevent CWE-379?

Many contemporary languages have functions which properly handle this condition. Older C temp file functions are especially susceptible. Try to store sensitive tempfiles in a directory which is not world readable -- i.e., per-user directories.

How does Plexicus detect and fix CWE-379?

Plexicus's SAST engine matches the data-flow signature for CWE-379 on every commit. When a match is found, our Codex Remedium agent opens a fix PR with the corrected code, tests, and a one-line summary for the reviewer.

Where can I learn more about CWE-379?

MITRE publishes the canonical definition at https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/379.html. You can also reference OWASP and NIST documentation for adjacent guidance.

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SAMPLE HANDOVER · ILLUSTRATIVE

Sample evidence handover

A trimmed view of what your team receives at the end of an AI Swarm Pentest engagement. Real engagements include full technical evidence, executive narrative, and a remediation plan.

VALIDATED FINDING Evidence attached

Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks/receiver

demo-project/sample-app · src/webhooks/receiver.py:42

SeverityHigh CVSS 3.18.6 Priority79 Confirmedvia replay

Untrusted caller-supplied URLs reach an internal egress without an allowlist. Replayed in a sandbox against a fresh authorised target — the same control was validated to fail twice.

REVIEWER-READY REMEDIATION Merge-ready PR

Validate the target URL against an allowlist of permitted hostnames. Reject private/internal IP ranges. Enforce HTTPS only.

plexicus/remediation/webhooks-ssrf 3 changed · 0 new files
42resp = requests.get(target_url)
42+if not is_allowed_host(target_url):
43+  raise WebhookRejected(target_url)
44+resp = requests.get(target_url, timeout=5)
Every engagement hands over:
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  • Validated findings list
  • Merge-ready PRs
  • Compliance mapping (NIS2 · DORA · CRA)