CWE-599 Variant Incomplete

Missing Validation of OpenSSL Certificate

This vulnerability occurs when an application uses OpenSSL but fails to properly verify server certificates by not calling SSL_get_verify_result(). Without this validation, the application may…

Definition

What is CWE-599?

This vulnerability occurs when an application uses OpenSSL but fails to properly verify server certificates by not calling SSL_get_verify_result(). Without this validation, the application may accept insecure or fraudulent certificates.
When an application connects to a server using OpenSSL, it must explicitly verify that the server's certificate is valid and trustworthy. Skipping the SSL_get_verify_result() function means the application blindly accepts any certificate presented, missing critical checks for expiration, proper signing by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA), hostname matching, and revocation status. This missing validation creates an open door for attackers to impersonate trusted servers using self-signed, expired, or otherwise invalid certificates. It enables man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks where encrypted traffic can be intercepted and decrypted, potentially exposing sensitive data like login credentials or API keys that the application transmits.
Real-world impact

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-599

No public CVE references are linked to this CWE in MITRE's catalog yet.

How attackers exploit it

Step-by-step attacker path

  1. 1

    Identify a code path that handles untrusted input without validation.

  2. 2

    Craft a payload that exercises the unsafe behavior — injection, traversal, overflow, or logic abuse.

  3. 3

    Deliver the payload through a normal request and observe the application's reaction.

  4. 4

    Iterate until the response leaks data, executes attacker code, or escalates privileges.

Vulnerable code example

Vulnerable C

The following OpenSSL code ensures that the host has a certificate.

Vulnerable C
if (cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) {
```
// got certificate, host can be trusted* 
  		
  		
  		 *//foo=SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);* 
  		
  		
  		 *//if (X509_V_OK==foo) ...* 
  		}
Secure code example

Secure pseudo

Secure pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
  const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
  return executeWithGuards(safe);
}
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Prevention checklist

How to prevent CWE-599

  • Architecture and Design Ensure that proper authentication is included in the system design.
  • Implementation Understand and properly implement all checks necessary to ensure the identity of entities involved in encrypted communications.
Detection signals

How to detect CWE-599

SAST High

Run static analysis (SAST) on the codebase looking for the unsafe pattern in the data flow.

DAST Moderate

Run dynamic application security testing against the live endpoint.

Runtime Moderate

Watch runtime logs for unusual exception traces, malformed input, or authorization bypass attempts.

Code review Moderate

Code review: flag any new code that handles input from this surface without using the validated framework helpers.

CWE-599

Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.

Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.

Frequently asked questions

Frequently asked questions

What is CWE-599?

This vulnerability occurs when an application uses OpenSSL but fails to properly verify server certificates by not calling SSL_get_verify_result(). Without this validation, the application may accept insecure or fraudulent certificates.

How serious is CWE-599?

MITRE has not published a likelihood-of-exploit rating for this weakness. Treat it as medium-impact until your threat model proves otherwise.

What languages or platforms are affected by CWE-599?

MITRE has not specified affected platforms for this CWE — it can apply across most application stacks.

How can I prevent CWE-599?

Ensure that proper authentication is included in the system design. Understand and properly implement all checks necessary to ensure the identity of entities involved in encrypted communications.

How does Plexicus detect and fix CWE-599?

Plexicus's SAST engine matches the data-flow signature for CWE-599 on every commit. When a match is found, our Codex Remedium agent opens a fix PR with the corrected code, tests, and a one-line summary for the reviewer.

Where can I learn more about CWE-599?

MITRE publishes the canonical definition at https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/599.html. You can also reference OWASP and NIST documentation for adjacent guidance.

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SAMPLE HANDOVER · ILLUSTRATIVE

Sample evidence handover

A trimmed view of what your team receives at the end of an AI Swarm Pentest engagement. Real engagements include full technical evidence, executive narrative, and a remediation plan.

VALIDATED FINDING Evidence attached

Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks/receiver

demo-project/sample-app · src/webhooks/receiver.py:42

SeverityHigh CVSS 3.18.6 Priority79 Confirmedvia replay

Untrusted caller-supplied URLs reach an internal egress without an allowlist. Replayed in a sandbox against a fresh authorised target — the same control was validated to fail twice.

REVIEWER-READY REMEDIATION Merge-ready PR

Validate the target URL against an allowlist of permitted hostnames. Reject private/internal IP ranges. Enforce HTTPS only.

plexicus/remediation/webhooks-ssrf 3 changed · 0 new files
42resp = requests.get(target_url)
42+if not is_allowed_host(target_url):
43+  raise WebhookRejected(target_url)
44+resp = requests.get(target_url, timeout=5)
Every engagement hands over:
  • Executive briefing
  • Validated findings list
  • Merge-ready PRs
  • Compliance mapping (NIS2 · DORA · CRA)