Unchecked Input for Loop Condition

Draft Base
Structure: Simple
Description

This vulnerability occurs when an application fails to properly validate or limit user-supplied values that control loop iterations. Without these checks, malicious input can force the program into an endless or excessively long loop, consuming system resources and leading to denial of service or application instability.

Extended Description

At its core, this weakness allows an attacker to manipulate a program's flow by controlling how many times a loop executes. Common scenarios include using an unexpectedly large integer for a counter, a negative number that bypasses termination logic, or a specially crafted string that causes unexpected parsing behavior within the loop condition. Developers often trust these values from sources like configuration files, APIs, or user inputs without implementing strict bounds checking. To prevent this, always validate and sanitize any external input before it determines loop behavior. Implement explicit limits on maximum iterations, use signed/unsigned integer checks to prevent wrap-around issues, and consider adding timeout mechanisms for processing loops. Treat loop control variables with the same level of distrust as any other user input, as they directly control resource consumption and application availability.

Common Consequences 1
Scope: Availability

Impact: DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)

Detection Methods 1
Automated Static AnalysisHigh
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Potential Mitigations 2
Phase: Implementation
Do not use user-controlled data for loop conditions.
Phase: Implementation
Perform input validation.
Demonstrative Examples 2
The following example demonstrates the weakness.

Code Example:

Bad
C
c

ID : DX-91

In the following C/C++ example the method processMessageFromSocket() will get a message from a socket, placed into a buffer, and will parse the contents of the buffer into a structure that contains the message length and the message body. A for loop is used to copy the message body into a local character string which will be passed to another method for processing.

Code Example:

Bad
C
c

// get message from socket and store into buffer*

c
c

// process message* success = processMessage(message);} return success;}

However, the message length variable (msgLength) from the structure is used as the condition for ending the for loop without validating that msgLength accurately reflects the actual length of the message body (Unchecked Input for Loop Condition). If msgLength indicates a length that is longer than the size of a message body (Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency), then this can result in a buffer over-read by reading past the end of the buffer (Buffer Over-read).
References 2
The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, and Justin Schuh
Addison Wesley
2006
ID: REF-62
Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM)
Object Management Group (OMG)
01-2016
ID: REF-962
Modes of Introduction
Implementation
Taxonomy Mapping
  • Software Fault Patterns
  • OMG ASCSM