CWE-607 Variant Draft

Public Static Final Field References Mutable Object

This vulnerability occurs when a class exposes a public or protected static final field that points to a changeable object. Because the field's reference is constant but the object itself is not,…

Definition

What is CWE-607?

This vulnerability occurs when a class exposes a public or protected static final field that points to a changeable object. Because the field's reference is constant but the object itself is not, malicious code or even accidental code in other packages can modify the object's contents, violating the intended immutability.
The core issue is a misunderstanding of the `final` keyword in Java and similar languages. When applied to an object reference, `final` only guarantees that the reference itself cannot be reassigned to point to a different object. It does not protect the internal state of the object that the reference points to. If that object is mutable—like an array, a collection, or a custom class with public setters—its data can be freely altered, even through the `static final` field. To prevent this, developers must ensure true immutability. This involves either assigning the static final field to an inherently immutable object (like a `String` or a boxed primitive) or defensively wrapping mutable objects. For collections, use `Collections.unmodifiableList()`, `Map.copyOf()`, or similar methods to create an unmodifiable view or a deep copy before assignment. This practice encapsulates the mutable data and enforces the read-only intent of the public static field.
Real-world impact

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-607

No public CVE references are linked to this CWE in MITRE's catalog yet.

How attackers exploit it

Step-by-step attacker path

  1. 1

    Identify a code path that handles untrusted input without validation.

  2. 2

    Craft a payload that exercises the unsafe behavior — injection, traversal, overflow, or logic abuse.

  3. 3

    Deliver the payload through a normal request and observe the application's reaction.

  4. 4

    Iterate until the response leaks data, executes attacker code, or escalates privileges.

Vulnerable code example

Vulnerable Java

Here, an array (which is inherently mutable) is labeled public static final.

Vulnerable Java
public static final String[] USER_ROLES;
Secure code example

Secure pseudo

Secure pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
  const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
  return executeWithGuards(safe);
}
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Prevention checklist

How to prevent CWE-607

  • Implementation Protect mutable objects by making them private. Restrict access to the getter and setter as well.
Detection signals

How to detect CWE-607

Automated Static Analysis High

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

CWE-607

Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.

Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.

Frequently asked questions

Frequently asked questions

What is CWE-607?

This vulnerability occurs when a class exposes a public or protected static final field that points to a changeable object. Because the field's reference is constant but the object itself is not, malicious code or even accidental code in other packages can modify the object's contents, violating the intended immutability.

How serious is CWE-607?

MITRE has not published a likelihood-of-exploit rating for this weakness. Treat it as medium-impact until your threat model proves otherwise.

What languages or platforms are affected by CWE-607?

MITRE lists the following affected platforms: Java.

How can I prevent CWE-607?

Protect mutable objects by making them private. Restrict access to the getter and setter as well.

How does Plexicus detect and fix CWE-607?

Plexicus's SAST engine matches the data-flow signature for CWE-607 on every commit. When a match is found, our Codex Remedium agent opens a fix PR with the corrected code, tests, and a one-line summary for the reviewer.

Where can I learn more about CWE-607?

MITRE publishes the canonical definition at https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/607.html. You can also reference OWASP and NIST documentation for adjacent guidance.

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SAMPLE HANDOVER · ILLUSTRATIVE

Sample evidence handover

A trimmed view of what your team receives at the end of an AI Swarm Pentest engagement. Real engagements include full technical evidence, executive narrative, and a remediation plan.

VALIDATED FINDING Evidence attached

Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks/receiver

demo-project/sample-app · src/webhooks/receiver.py:42

SeverityHigh CVSS 3.18.6 Priority79 Confirmedvia replay

Untrusted caller-supplied URLs reach an internal egress without an allowlist. Replayed in a sandbox against a fresh authorised target — the same control was validated to fail twice.

REVIEWER-READY REMEDIATION Merge-ready PR

Validate the target URL against an allowlist of permitted hostnames. Reject private/internal IP ranges. Enforce HTTPS only.

plexicus/remediation/webhooks-ssrf 3 changed · 0 new files
42resp = requests.get(target_url)
42+if not is_allowed_host(target_url):
43+  raise WebhookRejected(target_url)
44+resp = requests.get(target_url, timeout=5)
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