CWE-624 Base Incomplete

Executable Regular Expression Error

This vulnerability occurs when an application uses a regular expression that can execute code, either because it directly contains executable logic with unsafe user input, or because an attacker can…

Definition

What is CWE-624?

This vulnerability occurs when an application uses a regular expression that can execute code, either because it directly contains executable logic with unsafe user input, or because an attacker can inject pattern modifiers that enable code execution.
This flaw typically manifests in two ways. First, when user-supplied data is directly embedded into a regular expression pattern that gets evaluated as executable code, allowing an attacker to break out of the pattern context and run arbitrary commands. Second, and more subtly, when an attacker can inject special pattern modifiers (like the 'e' modifier in PHP's `preg_replace()`) that instruct the regex engine to execute the replacement string as code, effectively turning a simple text substitution into a remote code execution vulnerability. Developers should treat all user input destined for regex patterns as untrusted and avoid dynamically constructing patterns with it whenever possible. Special attention is required for functions like PHP's `preg_replace()` that historically supported the dangerous 'e' modifier, but the principle applies to any language or library where regex evaluation can cross into code execution. Always use safe, predefined patterns or rigorously validate and sanitize input to prevent modifier injection.
Real-world impact

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-624

  • Executable regexp in PHP by inserting "e" modifier into first argument to preg_replace

  • Executable regexp in PHP by inserting "e" modifier into first argument to preg_replace

  • Complex curly syntax inserted into the replacement argument to PHP preg_replace(), which uses the "/e" modifier

  • Function allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via the username field, which is used in a preg_replace function call with a /e (executable) modifier.

How attackers exploit it

Step-by-step attacker path

  1. 1

    Identify a code path that handles untrusted input without validation.

  2. 2

    Craft a payload that exercises the unsafe behavior — injection, traversal, overflow, or logic abuse.

  3. 3

    Deliver the payload through a normal request and observe the application's reaction.

  4. 4

    Iterate until the response leaks data, executes attacker code, or escalates privileges.

Vulnerable code example

Vulnerable pseudo

MITRE has not published a code example for this CWE. The pattern below is illustrative — see Resources for canonical references.

Vulnerable pseudo
// Example pattern — see MITRE for the canonical references.
function handleRequest(input) {
  // Untrusted input flows directly into the sensitive sink.
  return executeUnsafe(input);
}
Secure code example

Secure pseudo

Secure pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
  const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
  return executeWithGuards(safe);
}
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Prevention checklist

How to prevent CWE-624

  • Implementation The regular expression feature in some languages allows inputs to be quoted or escaped before insertion, such as \Q and \E in Perl.
Detection signals

How to detect CWE-624

SAST High

Run static analysis (SAST) on the codebase looking for the unsafe pattern in the data flow.

DAST Moderate

Run dynamic application security testing against the live endpoint.

Runtime Moderate

Watch runtime logs for unusual exception traces, malformed input, or authorization bypass attempts.

Code review Moderate

Code review: flag any new code that handles input from this surface without using the validated framework helpers.

CWE-624

Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.

Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.

Frequently asked questions

Frequently asked questions

What is CWE-624?

This vulnerability occurs when an application uses a regular expression that can execute code, either because it directly contains executable logic with unsafe user input, or because an attacker can inject pattern modifiers that enable code execution.

How serious is CWE-624?

MITRE has not published a likelihood-of-exploit rating for this weakness. Treat it as medium-impact until your threat model proves otherwise.

What languages or platforms are affected by CWE-624?

MITRE lists the following affected platforms: PHP, Perl.

How can I prevent CWE-624?

The regular expression feature in some languages allows inputs to be quoted or escaped before insertion, such as \Q and \E in Perl.

How does Plexicus detect and fix CWE-624?

Plexicus's SAST engine matches the data-flow signature for CWE-624 on every commit. When a match is found, our Codex Remedium agent opens a fix PR with the corrected code, tests, and a one-line summary for the reviewer.

Where can I learn more about CWE-624?

MITRE publishes the canonical definition at https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/624.html. You can also reference OWASP and NIST documentation for adjacent guidance.

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SAMPLE HANDOVER · ILLUSTRATIVE

Sample evidence handover

A trimmed view of what your team receives at the end of an AI Swarm Pentest engagement. Real engagements include full technical evidence, executive narrative, and a remediation plan.

VALIDATED FINDING Evidence attached

Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks/receiver

demo-project/sample-app · src/webhooks/receiver.py:42

SeverityHigh CVSS 3.18.6 Priority79 Confirmedvia replay

Untrusted caller-supplied URLs reach an internal egress without an allowlist. Replayed in a sandbox against a fresh authorised target — the same control was validated to fail twice.

REVIEWER-READY REMEDIATION Merge-ready PR

Validate the target URL against an allowlist of permitted hostnames. Reject private/internal IP ranges. Enforce HTTPS only.

plexicus/remediation/webhooks-ssrf 3 changed · 0 new files
42resp = requests.get(target_url)
42+if not is_allowed_host(target_url):
43+  raise WebhookRejected(target_url)
44+resp = requests.get(target_url, timeout=5)
Every engagement hands over:
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  • Validated findings list
  • Merge-ready PRs
  • Compliance mapping (NIS2 · DORA · CRA)