Use of Non-Canonical URL Paths for Authorization Decisions

Incomplete Variant
Structure: Simple
Description

This vulnerability occurs when an application's authorization logic relies on specific URL paths but fails to enforce a single, standardized format. Attackers can bypass access controls by using alternative, equivalent URL formats that the system doesn't recognize as the same protected resource.

Extended Description

Applications often define access rules for specific URLs, but many different URL formats can point to the same page. If the authorization check doesn't first convert URLs to a canonical (standardized) form, attackers can use variations like different character encodings, case changes, IP addresses instead of domain names, trailing slashes, or explicit port numbers to bypass security checks. Each variation appears different to the authorization system while loading the same protected content. To prevent this, always normalize URLs to a single canonical format before checking permissions. Implement a default-deny approach that rejects any non-standard URL format. This involves stripping unnecessary elements like default ports, removing trailing slashes, converting to lowercase, decoding encoded characters, and resolving hostnames consistently before any authorization decision is made.

Common Consequences 2
Scope: Access Control

Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism

An attacker may be able to bypass the authorization mechanism to gain access to the otherwise-protected URL.

Scope: Confidentiality

Impact: Read Files or Directories

If a non-canonical URL is used, the server may choose to return the contents of the file, instead of pre-processing the file (e.g. as a program).

Detection Methods 1
Automated Static AnalysisHigh
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Potential Mitigations 2
Phase: Architecture and Design
Make access control policy based on path information in canonical form. Use very restrictive regular expressions to validate that the path is in the expected form.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Reject all alternate path encodings that are not in the expected canonical form.
Demonstrative Examples 1
Example from CAPEC (CAPEC ID: 4, "Using Alternative IP Address Encodings"). An attacker identifies an application server that applies a security policy based on the domain and application name, so the access control policy covers authentication and authorization for anyone accessing http://example.domain:8080/application. However, by putting in the IP address of the host the application authentication and authorization controls may be bypassed http://192.168.0.1:8080/application. The attacker relies on the victim applying policy to the namespace abstraction and not having a default deny policy in place to manage exceptions.
Likelihood of Exploit

High

Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Technologies:
Web Server : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Implementation
Operation
Related Weaknesses
Taxonomy Mapping
  • The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011)