Use of Low-Level Functionality
Incomplete Base
Structure: Simple
Description
This vulnerability occurs when code bypasses high-level framework controls by directly using low-level system functions, violating the intended security model.
Using low-level functions like direct memory access or OS system calls can disable the built-in safeguards of your application framework. This creates inconsistencies and unexpected behaviors that attackers can exploit to bypass security controls, corrupt data, or gain unauthorized access. Detecting these violations manually across a large codebase is challenging. An ASPM like Plexicus can automatically identify such patterns through SAST/DAST and use AI to provide specific remediation code, helping you maintain framework compliance and close security gaps efficiently.
Common Consequences 1
Scope: Other
Impact: Other
Detection Methods 1
Automated Static AnalysisHigh
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)Demonstrative Examples 2
ID : DX-196
The following code defines a class named Echo. The class declares one native method (defined below), which uses C to echo commands entered on the console back to the user. The following C code defines the native method implemented in the Echo class:Code Example:
Bad
Java
javaCode Example:
Bad
C
cBecause the example is implemented in Java, it may appear that it is immune to memory issues like buffer overflow vulnerabilities. Although Java does do a good job of making memory operations safe, this protection does not extend to vulnerabilities occurring in source code written in other languages that are accessed using the Java Native Interface. Despite the memory protections offered in Java, the C code in this example is vulnerable to a buffer overflow because it makes use of gets(), which does not check the length of its input.
The Sun Java(TM) Tutorial provides the following description of JNI [See Reference]: The JNI framework lets your native method utilize Java objects in the same way that Java code uses these objects. A native method can create Java objects, including arrays and strings, and then inspect and use these objects to perform its tasks. A native method can also inspect and use objects created by Java application code. A native method can even update Java objects that it created or that were passed to it, and these updated objects are available to the Java application. Thus, both the native language side and the Java side of an application can create, update, and access Java objects and then share these objects between them.
The vulnerability in the example above could easily be detected through a source code audit of the native method implementation. This may not be practical or possible depending on the availability of the C source code and the way the project is built, but in many cases it may suffice. However, the ability to share objects between Java and native methods expands the potential risk to much more insidious cases where improper data handling in Java may lead to unexpected vulnerabilities in native code or unsafe operations in native code corrupt data structures in Java. Vulnerabilities in native code accessed through a Java application are typically exploited in the same manner as they are in applications written in the native language. The only challenge to such an attack is for the attacker to identify that the Java application uses native code to perform certain operations. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways, including identifying specific behaviors that are often implemented with native code or by exploiting a system information exposure in the Java application that reveals its use of JNI [See Reference].
ID : DX-197
The following example opens a socket to connect to a remote server.Code Example:
Bad
Java
java// Perform servlet tasks.* ...
javajavaA Socket object is created directly within the Java servlet, which is a dangerous way to manage remote connections.
Modes of Introduction
Implementation
Related Attack Patterns
Related Weaknesses