CWE-925 Variant Incomplete

Improper Verification of Intent by Broadcast Receiver

This vulnerability occurs when an Android app's Broadcast Receiver accepts an Intent without confirming it originated from a trusted, authorized source, such as the operating system.

Definition

What is CWE-925?

This vulnerability occurs when an Android app's Broadcast Receiver accepts an Intent without confirming it originated from a trusted, authorized source, such as the operating system.
Android allows apps to register Broadcast Receivers for specific system-generated Intents, like a device boot completion. These are implicit intents that, by design, should only be sent by the OS. However, the same receiver registration also accepts explicit intents, which can be crafted and sent by any app on the device. A malicious app can exploit this by sending a carefully crafted explicit intent to the receiver. If the receiving app fails to verify the intent's source, it may incorrectly process the malicious intent as a legitimate system broadcast. This confusion can trigger unauthorized actions, expose sensitive data, or crash the application.
Real-world impact

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-925

No public CVE references are linked to this CWE in MITRE's catalog yet.

How attackers exploit it

Step-by-step attacker path

  1. 1

    The following example demonstrates the weakness.

  2. 2

    The ShutdownReceiver class will handle the intent:

  3. 3

    Because the method does not confirm that the intent action is the expected system intent, any received intent will trigger the shutdown procedure, as shown here:

  4. 4

    An attacker can use this behavior to cause a denial of service.

Vulnerable code example

Vulnerable XML

The following example demonstrates the weakness.

Vulnerable XML
<manifest package="com.example.vulnerableApplication">
  		<application>
```
...* 
  		
  		```
  				<receiver android:name=".ShutdownReceiver">
  					<intent-filter>
  						<action android:name="android.intent.action.ACTION_SHUTDOWN" />
  					</intent-filter>
  				</receiver>
```
...* 
  		
  		</application></manifest>
Attacker payload

Because the method does not confirm that the intent action is the expected system intent, any received intent will trigger the shutdown procedure, as shown here:

Attacker payload Java
window.location = examplescheme://method?parameter=value
Secure code example

Secure pseudo

Secure pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
  const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
  return executeWithGuards(safe);
}
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Prevention checklist

How to prevent CWE-925

  • Architecture and Design Before acting on the Intent, check the Intent Action to make sure it matches the expected System action.
Detection signals

How to detect CWE-925

Automated Static Analysis High

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

CWE-925

Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.

Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.

Frequently asked questions

Frequently asked questions

What is CWE-925?

This vulnerability occurs when an Android app's Broadcast Receiver accepts an Intent without confirming it originated from a trusted, authorized source, such as the operating system.

How serious is CWE-925?

MITRE has not published a likelihood-of-exploit rating for this weakness. Treat it as medium-impact until your threat model proves otherwise.

What languages or platforms are affected by CWE-925?

MITRE lists the following affected platforms: Mobile.

How can I prevent CWE-925?

Before acting on the Intent, check the Intent Action to make sure it matches the expected System action.

How does Plexicus detect and fix CWE-925?

Plexicus's SAST engine matches the data-flow signature for CWE-925 on every commit. When a match is found, our Codex Remedium agent opens a fix PR with the corrected code, tests, and a one-line summary for the reviewer.

Where can I learn more about CWE-925?

MITRE publishes the canonical definition at https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/925.html. You can also reference OWASP and NIST documentation for adjacent guidance.

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SAMPLE HANDOVER · ILLUSTRATIVE

Sample evidence handover

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VALIDATED FINDING Evidence attached

Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks/receiver

demo-project/sample-app · src/webhooks/receiver.py:42

SeverityHigh CVSS 3.18.6 Priority79 Confirmedvia replay

Untrusted caller-supplied URLs reach an internal egress without an allowlist. Replayed in a sandbox against a fresh authorised target — the same control was validated to fail twice.

REVIEWER-READY REMEDIATION Merge-ready PR

Validate the target URL against an allowlist of permitted hostnames. Reject private/internal IP ranges. Enforce HTTPS only.

plexicus/remediation/webhooks-ssrf 3 changed · 0 new files
42resp = requests.get(target_url)
42+if not is_allowed_host(target_url):
43+  raise WebhookRejected(target_url)
44+resp = requests.get(target_url, timeout=5)
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  • Merge-ready PRs
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