- Testing of memory-device contents after clearing or erase commands. - Dynamic analysis of memory contents during device operation to detect specific, confidential assets. - Architecture and design analysis of memory clear and erase operations.
CWE-1330 Variant Draft
Remanent Data Readable after Memory Erase
Sensitive data stored in memory hardware can still be accessed or reconstructed even after a standard clear or erase command has been executed.
Definition
What is CWE-1330?
Sensitive data stored in memory hardware can still be accessed or reconstructed even after a standard clear or erase command has been executed.
Data remanence happens when memory hardware doesn't completely eliminate stored information during a standard erase operation. This can occur due to performance-focused designs that only clear organizational metadata (like file pointers) while leaving the actual data intact, or due to the physical properties of memory types like SRAM and DRAM, where residual electrical charge can retain data. To counter this, memory devices often provide separate 'secure erase' commands designed to overwrite the actual data cells.
For robust protection, especially in self-encrypting storage devices, a 'cryptographic erase' is used. This method doesn't overwrite the encrypted data on the physical media; instead, it permanently deletes the decryption keys. Since the remaining data is still encrypted, protection relies entirely on the strength of the encryption algorithm. Therefore, understanding your hardware's specific erase capabilities is critical for ensuring data is truly irrecoverable.
Auswirkungen in der Praxis
Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-1330
-
Firmware Data Deletion Vulnerability in which a base station factory reset might not delete all user information. The impact of this enables a new owner of a used device that has been "factory-default reset" with a vulnerable firmware version can still retrieve, at least, the previous owner's wireless network name, and the previous owner's wireless security (such as WPA2) key. This issue was addressed with improved, data deletion.
Wie Angreifer es ausnutzen
Angreiferpfad Schritt für Schritt
- 1
Consider a device that uses flash memory for non-volatile-data storage. To optimize flash-access performance or reliable-flash lifetime, the device might limit the number of flash writes/erases by maintaining some state in internal SRAM and only committing changes to flash memory periodically.
- 2
The device also supports user reset to factory defaults with the expectation that all personal information is erased from the device after this operation. On factory reset, user files are erased using explicit, erase commands supported by the flash device.
- 3
In the given, system design, the flash-file system can support performance-optimized erase such that only the file metadata are erased and not the content. If this optimized erase is used for files containing user data during factory-reset flow, then device, flash memory can contain remanent data from these files.
- 4
On device-factory reset, the implementation might not erase these copies, since the file organization has changed and the flash file system does not have the metadata to track all previous copies.
- 5
A flash-memory region that is used by a flash-file system should be fully erased as part of the factory-reset flow. This should include secure-erase flow for the flash media such as overwriting patterns multiple times followed by erase.
Verwundbares Codebeispiel
Vulnerable pseudo
MITRE hat kein Codebeispiel für diese CWE veröffentlicht. Das untenstehende Muster ist illustrativ — kanonische Referenzen findest du unter Ressourcen.
// Example pattern — see MITRE for the canonical references.
function handleRequest(input) {
// Untrusted input flows directly into the sensitive sink.
return executeUnsafe(input);
} Sicheres Codebeispiel
Secure pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
return executeWithGuards(safe);
} What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Präventions-Checkliste
How to prevent CWE-1330
- Architecture and Design - Support for secure-erase commands that apply multiple cycles of overwriting memory with known patterns and of erasing actual content. - Support for cryptographic erase in self-encrypting, memory devices. - External, physical tools to erase memory such as ultraviolet-rays-based erase of Electrically erasable, programmable, read-only memory (EEPROM). - Physical destruction of media device. This is done for repurposed or scrapped devices that are no longer in use.
Erkennungssignale
How to detect CWE-1330
- Testing of memory-device contents after clearing or erase commands. - Dynamic analysis of memory contents during device operation to detect specific, confidential assets. - Architecture and design analysis of memory clear and erase operations.
Plexicus erkennt CWE-1330 automatisch und öffnet in unter 60 Sekunden einen Fix-PR.
Codex Remedium scannt jeden Commit, identifiziert genau diese Schwachstelle und liefert einen reviewer-ready Pull Request mit dem Patch. Keine Tickets. Keine Hand-offs.
Häufig gestellte Fragen Was ist CWE-1330?
Wie gravierend ist CWE-1330?
Welche Sprachen oder Plattformen sind von CWE-1330 betroffen?
Wie kann ich CWE-1330 verhindern?
Wie erkennt und behebt Plexicus CWE-1330?
Wo erfahre ich mehr über CWE-1330?
Frequently asked questions
Was ist CWE-1330?
Sensitive data stored in memory hardware can still be accessed or reconstructed even after a standard clear or erase command has been executed.
Wie gravierend ist CWE-1330?
MITRE hat für diese Schwachstelle keine Exploit-Wahrscheinlichkeit veröffentlicht. Behandle sie als mittlere Auswirkung, bis dein Threat Model anderes belegt.
Welche Sprachen oder Plattformen sind von CWE-1330 betroffen?
MITRE lists the following affected platforms: Not OS-Specific, Not Architecture-Specific, Security Hardware, Not Technology-Specific.
Wie kann ich CWE-1330 verhindern?
- Support for secure-erase commands that apply multiple cycles of overwriting memory with known patterns and of erasing actual content. - Support for cryptographic erase in self-encrypting, memory devices. - External, physical tools to erase memory such as ultraviolet-rays-based erase of Electrically erasable, programmable, read-only memory (EEPROM). - Physical destruction of media device. This is done for repurposed or scrapped devices that are no longer in use.
Wie erkennt und behebt Plexicus CWE-1330?
Die SAST-Engine von Plexicus erkennt die Datenfluss-Signatur von CWE-1330 bei jedem Commit. Bei einem Treffer öffnet unser Codex-Remedium-Agent einen Fix-PR mit korrigiertem Code, Tests und einer einzeiligen Zusammenfassung für den Reviewer.
Wo erfahre ich mehr über CWE-1330?
MITRE veröffentlicht die kanonische Definition unter https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1330.html. Für ergänzende Hinweise kannst du auch die OWASP- und NIST-Dokumentation heranziehen.
Verwandte Schwachstellen
Weaknesses related to CWE-1330
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