Improper Access Control Applied to Mirrored or Aliased Memory Regions

Incomplete Base
Structure: Simple
Description

This vulnerability occurs when a hardware design maps the same physical memory to multiple addresses (aliasing or mirroring) but fails to apply consistent read/write permissions across all these addresses. An attacker blocked from accessing a protected memory region might still reach the same data through its unprotected aliased address, bypassing security controls.

Extended Description

Hardware designs often use memory aliasing for legitimate purposes like redundancy, fault tolerance, or simplifying address decoding logic. However, a critical security flaw emerges when the access control logic checks permissions for only one address path and not its aliases. This creates an inconsistent security state where the same physical memory cell has different protection levels depending on which logical address is used to access it. From a developer or attacker perspective, this inconsistency becomes an exploitable bypass. An untrusted process or agent denied access to a primary address can simply target the alternate, aliased address to read or write protected memory. Furthermore, if an attacker can manipulate system address mapping registers, they might be able to create malicious aliases themselves, fundamentally undermining the hardware's memory isolation guarantees.

Common Consequences 3
Scope: Confidentiality

Impact: Read Memory

Scope: Integrity

Impact: Modify Memory

Scope: Availability

Impact: DoS: Instability

Potential Mitigations 2
Phase: Architecture and DesignImplementation
The checks should be applied for consistency access rights between primary memory regions and any mirrored or aliased memory regions. If different memory protection units (MPU) are protecting the aliased regions, their protected range definitions and policies should be synchronized.
Phase: Architecture and DesignImplementation
The controls that allow enabling memory aliases or changing the size of mapped memory regions should only be programmable by trusted software components.
Demonstrative Examples 1
In a System-on-a-Chip (SoC) design the system fabric uses 16 bit addresses. An IP unit (Unit_A) has 4 kilobyte of internal memory which is mapped into a 16 kilobyte address range in the system fabric address map. | | | | System Address | Mapped to | | 0x0000 - 0x3FFF | Unit_A registers : 0x0000 - 0x0FFF | | 0x4000 - 0xFFFF | Other IPs & Memory | To protect the register controls in Unit_A unprivileged software is blocked from accessing addresses between 0x0000 - 0x0FFF. The address decoder of Unit_A masks off the higher order address bits and decodes only the lower 12 bits for computing the offset into the 4 kilobyte internal memory space.

Code Example:

Bad
Other

In this design the aliased memory address ranges are these:

0x0000 - 0x0FFF

0x1000 - 0x1FFF

0x2000 - 0x2FFF

0x3000 - 0x3FFF

The same register can be accessed using four different addresses: 0x0000, 0x1000, 0x2000, 0x3000.

The system address filter only blocks access to range 0x0000 - 0x0FFF and does not block access to the aliased addresses in 0x1000 - 0x3FFF range. Thus, untrusted software can leverage the aliased memory addresses to bypass the memory protection.

Code Example:

Good
Other

In this design the aliased memory addresses (0x1000 - 0x3FFF) could be blocked from all system software access since they are not used by software.

Alternately, the MPU logic can be changed to apply the memory protection policies to the full address range mapped to Unit_A (0x0000 - 0x3FFF).

Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Technologies:
Memory Hardware : UndeterminedProcessor Hardware : UndeterminedMicrocontroller Hardware : UndeterminedNetwork on Chip Hardware : UndeterminedSystem on Chip : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Architecture and Design
Implementation