Improper Neutralization of Variable Name Delimiters

Incomplete Variant
Structure: Simple
Description

This vulnerability occurs when an application fails to properly sanitize or escape special characters that act as delimiters for variable names before passing data to another component. Attackers can inject these delimiters to manipulate how variables are interpreted.

Extended Description

When an application processes user-supplied data, characters like dollar signs ($), percent signs (%), or braces {} are often used to denote variable names. If the software doesn't filter these delimiter characters, an attacker can inject them to alter the intended variable resolution. This can force the system to read, write, or execute code based on attacker-controlled variable names, leading to data exposure, privilege escalation, or remote code execution. To prevent this, always validate and sanitize input by escaping or removing special delimiter characters before using data in contexts that interpret variables. Implement strict allow-lists for acceptable characters in variable names and use parameterized interfaces or safe template engines that automatically handle delimiter neutralization. Regular security testing should include attempts to inject common delimiters to verify proper handling.

Common Consequences 1
Scope: Integrity

Impact: Unexpected State

Potential Mitigations 4
Developers should anticipate that variable name delimiters will be injected/removed/manipulated in the input vectors of their product. Use an appropriate combination of denylists and allowlists to ensure only valid, expected and appropriate input is processed by the system.
Phase: Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Phase: Implementation

Strategy: Output Encoding

While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')).
Phase: Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (Double Decoding of the Same Data). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
Observed Examples 2
CVE-2005-0129"%" variable is expanded by wildcard function into disallowed commands.
CVE-2002-0770Server trusts client to expand macros, allows macro characters to be expanded to trigger resultant information exposure.
Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Implementation
Taxonomy Mapping
  • PLOVER
  • Software Fault Patterns
Notes
Research GapUnder-studied.