CWE-467 Variant Draft High likelihood

Use of sizeof() on a Pointer Type

This vulnerability occurs when a developer uses the sizeof() operator on a pointer variable instead of the data it points to, leading to incorrect size calculations and potential buffer overflows or…

Definition

What is CWE-467?

This vulnerability occurs when a developer uses the sizeof() operator on a pointer variable instead of the data it points to, leading to incorrect size calculations and potential buffer overflows or underflows.
Using sizeof() on a pointer returns the size of the pointer itself (e.g., 4 or 8 bytes for the memory address), not the size of the allocated object or data structure it references. This is a common mistake when programmers intend to calculate buffer sizes, perform memory operations like memcpy, or allocate dynamic memory, resulting in calculations that are off by a factor of the pointer size. While sizeof(pointer) can be intentionally used for platform-specific code (like determining system word size), its presence usually indicates a logic bug. To avoid this, always ensure sizeof() is applied to the dereferenced pointer type (e.g., sizeof(*pointer)) or the actual data type name, especially when dealing with arrays, structs, or dynamically allocated memory blocks.
Real-world impact

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-467

No public CVE references are linked to this CWE in MITRE's catalog yet.

How attackers exploit it

Step-by-step attacker path

  1. 1

    Care should be taken to ensure sizeof returns the size of the data structure itself, and not the size of the pointer to the data structure.

  2. 2

    In this example, sizeof(foo) returns the size of the pointer.

  3. 3

    In this example, sizeof(*foo) returns the size of the data structure and not the size of the pointer.

  4. 4

    This example defines a fixed username and password. The AuthenticateUser() function is intended to accept a username and a password from an untrusted user, and check to ensure that it matches the username and password. If the username and password match, AuthenticateUser() is intended to indicate that authentication succeeded.

  5. 5

    In AuthenticateUser(), because sizeof() is applied to a parameter with an array type, the sizeof() call might return 4 on many modern architectures. As a result, the strncmp() call only checks the first four characters of the input password, resulting in a partial comparison (CWE-187), leading to improper authentication (CWE-287).

Vulnerable code example

Vulnerable C

In this example, sizeof(foo) returns the size of the pointer.

Vulnerable C
double *foo;
  ...
  foo = (double *)malloc(sizeof(foo));
Attacker payload

Because of the partial comparison, any of these passwords would still cause authentication to succeed for the "admin" user:

Attacker payload
pass5
  passABCDEFGH
  passWORD
Secure code example

Secure C

In this example, sizeof(*foo) returns the size of the data structure and not the size of the pointer.

Secure C
double *foo;
  ...
  foo = (double *)malloc(sizeof(*foo));
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Prevention checklist

How to prevent CWE-467

  • Implementation Use expressions such as "sizeof(*pointer)" instead of "sizeof(pointer)", unless you intend to run sizeof() on a pointer type to gain some platform independence or if you are allocating a variable on the stack.
Detection signals

How to detect CWE-467

Automated Static Analysis High

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

CWE-467

Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.

Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.

Frequently asked questions

Frequently asked questions

What is CWE-467?

This vulnerability occurs when a developer uses the sizeof() operator on a pointer variable instead of the data it points to, leading to incorrect size calculations and potential buffer overflows or underflows.

How serious is CWE-467?

MITRE rates the likelihood of exploit as High — this weakness is actively exploited in the wild and should be prioritized for remediation.

What languages or platforms are affected by CWE-467?

MITRE lists the following affected platforms: C, C++.

How can I prevent CWE-467?

Use expressions such as "sizeof(*pointer)" instead of "sizeof(pointer)", unless you intend to run sizeof() on a pointer type to gain some platform independence or if you are allocating a variable on the stack.

How does Plexicus detect and fix CWE-467?

Plexicus's SAST engine matches the data-flow signature for CWE-467 on every commit. When a match is found, our Codex Remedium agent opens a fix PR with the corrected code, tests, and a one-line summary for the reviewer.

Where can I learn more about CWE-467?

MITRE publishes the canonical definition at https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/467.html. You can also reference OWASP and NIST documentation for adjacent guidance.

Ready to validate what matters?

Ready to validate what matters?

Plexicus is Proof-Driven AppSec: validated findings, contextual understanding, and reviewed remediation — anchored in evidence, scoped with you.

Qualification

Check whether AI Swarm Pentest fits your environment.

Share the minimum context. We will review the scope and tell you the next commercial step.

Before submitting — verify you fit

Teams with fewer than 50 developers: start a 14-day Trial instead of booking a demo. Start a 14-day Trial →

0 / 280

No commitment. If you don't fit, we'll tell you.

SAMPLE HANDOVER · ILLUSTRATIVE

Sample evidence handover

A trimmed view of what your team receives at the end of an AI Swarm Pentest engagement. Real engagements include full technical evidence, executive narrative, and a remediation plan.

VALIDATED FINDING Evidence attached

Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks/receiver

demo-project/sample-app · src/webhooks/receiver.py:42

SeverityHigh CVSS 3.18.6 Priority79 Confirmedvia replay

Untrusted caller-supplied URLs reach an internal egress without an allowlist. Replayed in a sandbox against a fresh authorised target — the same control was validated to fail twice.

REVIEWER-READY REMEDIATION Merge-ready PR

Validate the target URL against an allowlist of permitted hostnames. Reject private/internal IP ranges. Enforce HTTPS only.

plexicus/remediation/webhooks-ssrf 3 changed · 0 new files
42resp = requests.get(target_url)
42+if not is_allowed_host(target_url):
43+  raise WebhookRejected(target_url)
44+resp = requests.get(target_url, timeout=5)
Every engagement hands over:
  • Executive briefing
  • Validated findings list
  • Merge-ready PRs
  • Compliance mapping (NIS2 · DORA · CRA)