CWE-1239 Variante Rascunho

Improper Zeroization of Hardware Register

This vulnerability occurs when a hardware component fails to properly erase sensitive data from its internal registers before a new user or process gains access to the hardware block.

Definição

What is CWE-1239?

This vulnerability occurs when a hardware component fails to properly erase sensitive data from its internal registers before a new user or process gains access to the hardware block.
Hardware blocks, like cryptographic accelerators, use built-in registers to temporarily hold data during operations. These registers can retain sensitive information such as encryption keys or passwords, which becomes a security risk if not cleared. When control of the hardware switches—for example, during a mode change or between different software processes—the next entity accessing the registers might be able to read the previous user's leftover data. To prevent data leaks, hardware must actively clear its registers during user transitions or when a physical tamper event is detected. This clearing process, often called zeroization, is a critical security requirement in standards like FIPS-140-2 for ensuring that sensitive data isn't exposed unintentionally.
Impacto no mundo real

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-1239

Ainda não há referências CVE públicas associadas a este CWE no catálogo da MITRE.

Como os atacantes a exploram

Trajeto do atacante passo a passo

  1. 1

    Suppose a hardware IP for implementing an encryption routine works as expected, but it leaves the intermediate results in some registers that can be accessed. Exactly why this access happens is immaterial - it might be unintentional or intentional, where the designer wanted a "quick fix" for something.

  2. 2

    The example code below [REF-1379] is taken from the SHA256 Interface/wrapper controller module of the HACK@DAC'21 buggy OpenPiton SoC. Within the wrapper module there are a set of 16 memory-mapped registers referenced data[0] to data[15]. These registers are 32 bits in size and are used to store the data received on the AXI Lite interface for hashing. Once both the message to be hashed and a request to start the hash computation are received, the values of these registers will be forwarded to the underlying SHA256 module for processing. Once forwarded, the values in these registers no longer need to be retained. In fact, if not cleared or overwritten, these sensitive values can be read over the AXI Lite interface, potentially compromising any previously confidential data stored therein.

  3. 3

    In the previous code snippet [REF-1379] there is the lack of a data clearance mechanism for the memory-mapped I/O registers after their utilization. These registers get cleared only when a reset condition is met. This condition is met when either the global negative-edge reset input signal (rst_ni) or the dedicated reset input signal for SHA256 peripheral (rst_3) is active. In other words, if either of these reset signals is true, the registers will be cleared. However, in cases where there is not a reset condition these registers retain their values until the next hash operation. It is during the time between an old hash operation and a new hash operation that that data is open to unauthorized disclosure.

  4. 4

    To correct the issue of data persisting between hash operations, the memory mapped I/O registers need to be cleared once the values written in these registers are propagated to the SHA256 module. This could be done for example by adding a new condition to zeroize the memory mapped I/O registers once the hash value is computed, i.e., hashValid signal asserted, as shown in the good code example below [REF-1380]. This fix will clear the memory-mapped I/O registers after the data has been provided as input to the SHA engine.

Exemplo de código vulnerável

Vulnerable Verilog

The example code below [REF-1379] is taken from the SHA256 Interface/wrapper controller module of the HACK@DAC'21 buggy OpenPiton SoC. Within the wrapper module there are a set of 16 memory-mapped registers referenced data[0] to data[15]. These registers are 32 bits in size and are used to store the data received on the AXI Lite interface for hashing. Once both the message to be hashed and a request to start the hash computation are received, the values of these registers will be forwarded to the underlying SHA256 module for processing. Once forwarded, the values in these registers no longer need to be retained. In fact, if not cleared or overwritten, these sensitive values can be read over the AXI Lite interface, potentially compromising any previously confidential data stored therein.

Vulnerável Verilog 
...

```
   // Implement SHA256 I/O memory map interface
   // Write side
   always @(posedge clk_i)
  	 begin
  		 if(~(rst_ni && ~rst_3))
  			 begin
  				 startHash <= 0;
  				 newMessage <= 0;
  				 data[0] <= 0;
  				 data[1] <= 0;
  				 data[2] <= 0;
  				 ...
  				 data[14] <= 0;
  				 data[15] <= 0;
 ...
Exemplo de código seguro

Secure Verilog

To correct the issue of data persisting between hash operations, the memory mapped I/O registers need to be cleared once the values written in these registers are propagated to the SHA256 module. This could be done for example by adding a new condition to zeroize the memory mapped I/O registers once the hash value is computed, i.e., hashValid signal asserted, as shown in the good code example below [REF-1380]. This fix will clear the memory-mapped I/O registers after the data has been provided as input to the SHA engine.

Seguro Verilog 
...

```
   // Implement SHA256 I/O memory map interface
   // Write side
   always @(posedge clk_i)
  	 begin
  		 if(~(rst_ni && ~rst_3))
  			 begin
  				 startHash <= 0;
  				 newMessage <= 0;
  				 data[0] <= 0;
  				 data[1] <= 0;
  				 data[2] <= 0;
  				 ...
  				 data[14] <= 0;
  				 data[15] <= 0;
  			 end
```
else if(hashValid && ~hashValid_r)** 
  		```
```
begin** 
  			```
```
data[0] <= 0;** 
  				
  				 **data[1] <= 0;** 
  				
  				 **data[2] <= 0;** 
  				
  				 **...** 
  				
  				 **data[14] <= 0;** 
  				
  				 **data[15] <= 0;** 
  				 end
  			 ...
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Lista de verificação de prevenção

How to prevent CWE-1239

  • Architecture and Design Every register potentially containing sensitive information must have a policy specifying how and when information is cleared, in addition to clarifying if it is the responsibility of the hardware logic or IP user to initiate the zeroization procedure at the appropriate time.
Sinais de deteção

How to detect CWE-1239

SAST High

Executar análise estática (SAST) na base de código à procura do padrão inseguro no fluxo de dados.

DAST Moderate

Executar testes dinâmicos de segurança de aplicações (DAST) contra o endpoint em execução.

Runtime Moderate

Monitorizar os registos em tempo de execução para traços de exceção invulgares, input malformado ou tentativas de contornar a autorização.

Code review Moderate

Revisão de código: sinalizar qualquer novo código que trate input desta superfície sem usar os ajudantes validados do framework.

Correção automática do Plexicus

O Plexicus deteta automaticamente o CWE-1239 e abre um PR de correção em menos de 60 segundos.

O Codex Remedium analisa cada commit, identifica esta fraqueza exata e entrega um pull request pronto para revisão com o patch. Sem tickets. Sem transferências.

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Perguntas frequentes

Frequently asked questions

O que é o CWE-1239?

This vulnerability occurs when a hardware component fails to properly erase sensitive data from its internal registers before a new user or process gains access to the hardware block.

Qual a gravidade do CWE-1239?

A MITRE não publicou uma classificação de probabilidade de exploração para esta fraqueza. Trate-a como impacto médio até o seu modelo de ameaças provar o contrário.

Que linguagens ou plataformas são afetadas pelo CWE-1239?

MITRE lists the following affected platforms: Not OS-Specific, Not Architecture-Specific, System on Chip.

Como posso prevenir o CWE-1239?

Every register potentially containing sensitive information must have a policy specifying how and when information is cleared, in addition to clarifying if it is the responsibility of the hardware logic or IP user to initiate the zeroization procedure at the appropriate time.

Como é que o Plexicus deteta e corrige o CWE-1239?

O motor SAST do Plexicus correlaciona a assinatura de fluxo de dados do CWE-1239 em cada commit. Quando é encontrada uma correspondência, o nosso agente Codex Remedium abre um PR de correção com o código corrigido, testes e um resumo de uma linha para o revisor.

Onde posso saber mais sobre o CWE-1239?

A MITRE publica a definição canónica em https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1239.html. Pode também consultar a documentação da OWASP e do NIST para orientações adjacentes.

Fraquezas relacionadas

Weaknesses related to CWE-1239

CWE-226 Pai

Sensitive Information in Resource Not Removed Before Reuse

This vulnerability occurs when a system releases a resource like memory or a file for reuse but fails to erase the sensitive data it…

CWE-1272 Irmão

Sensitive Information Uncleared Before Debug/Power State Transition

This vulnerability occurs when a device changes its power mode or enters a debug state but fails to wipe sensitive data that should become…

CWE-1301 Irmão

Insufficient or Incomplete Data Removal within Hardware Component

The product's data removal process fails to completely erase all data from hardware components, potentially leaving sensitive information…

CWE-1342 Irmão

Information Exposure through Microarchitectural State after Transient Execution

This vulnerability occurs when a CPU fails to completely erase temporary data traces left behind by speculative execution or error…

CWE-244 Irmão

Improper Clearing of Heap Memory Before Release ('Heap Inspection')

Using realloc() to resize buffers containing secrets like passwords or keys can leave that sensitive data exposed in memory, as the…

Recursos

Further reading

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