- Testing of memory-device contents after clearing or erase commands. - Dynamic analysis of memory contents during device operation to detect specific, confidential assets. - Architecture and design analysis of memory clear and erase operations.
CWE-1330 Variante Borrador
Remanent Data Readable after Memory Erase
Sensitive data stored in memory hardware can still be accessed or reconstructed even after a standard clear or erase command has been executed.
Definición
What is CWE-1330?
Sensitive data stored in memory hardware can still be accessed or reconstructed even after a standard clear or erase command has been executed.
Data remanence happens when memory hardware doesn't completely eliminate stored information during a standard erase operation. This can occur due to performance-focused designs that only clear organizational metadata (like file pointers) while leaving the actual data intact, or due to the physical properties of memory types like SRAM and DRAM, where residual electrical charge can retain data. To counter this, memory devices often provide separate 'secure erase' commands designed to overwrite the actual data cells.
For robust protection, especially in self-encrypting storage devices, a 'cryptographic erase' is used. This method doesn't overwrite the encrypted data on the physical media; instead, it permanently deletes the decryption keys. Since the remaining data is still encrypted, protection relies entirely on the strength of the encryption algorithm. Therefore, understanding your hardware's specific erase capabilities is critical for ensuring data is truly irrecoverable.
Impacto en el mundo real
Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-1330
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Firmware Data Deletion Vulnerability in which a base station factory reset might not delete all user information. The impact of this enables a new owner of a used device that has been "factory-default reset" with a vulnerable firmware version can still retrieve, at least, the previous owner's wireless network name, and the previous owner's wireless security (such as WPA2) key. This issue was addressed with improved, data deletion.
Cómo lo explotan los atacantes
Ruta del atacante paso a paso
- 1
Consider a device that uses flash memory for non-volatile-data storage. To optimize flash-access performance or reliable-flash lifetime, the device might limit the number of flash writes/erases by maintaining some state in internal SRAM and only committing changes to flash memory periodically.
- 2
The device also supports user reset to factory defaults with the expectation that all personal information is erased from the device after this operation. On factory reset, user files are erased using explicit, erase commands supported by the flash device.
- 3
In the given, system design, the flash-file system can support performance-optimized erase such that only the file metadata are erased and not the content. If this optimized erase is used for files containing user data during factory-reset flow, then device, flash memory can contain remanent data from these files.
- 4
On device-factory reset, the implementation might not erase these copies, since the file organization has changed and the flash file system does not have the metadata to track all previous copies.
- 5
A flash-memory region that is used by a flash-file system should be fully erased as part of the factory-reset flow. This should include secure-erase flow for the flash media such as overwriting patterns multiple times followed by erase.
Ejemplo de código vulnerable
Vulnerable pseudo
MITRE no ha publicado un ejemplo de código para esta CWE. El patrón siguiente es ilustrativo — consulta Recursos para referencias canónicas.
// Example pattern — see MITRE for the canonical references.
function handleRequest(input) {
// Untrusted input flows directly into the sensitive sink.
return executeUnsafe(input);
} Ejemplo de código seguro
Secure pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
return executeWithGuards(safe);
} What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Lista de prevención
How to prevent CWE-1330
- Architecture and Design - Support for secure-erase commands that apply multiple cycles of overwriting memory with known patterns and of erasing actual content. - Support for cryptographic erase in self-encrypting, memory devices. - External, physical tools to erase memory such as ultraviolet-rays-based erase of Electrically erasable, programmable, read-only memory (EEPROM). - Physical destruction of media device. This is done for repurposed or scrapped devices that are no longer in use.
Señales de detección
How to detect CWE-1330
- Testing of memory-device contents after clearing or erase commands. - Dynamic analysis of memory contents during device operation to detect specific, confidential assets. - Architecture and design analysis of memory clear and erase operations.
Plexicus detecta automáticamente CWE-1330 y abre un PR de corrección en menos de 60 segundos.
Codex Remedium escanea cada commit, identifica esta debilidad concreta y entrega un pull request listo para revisión con el parche. Sin tickets. Sin traspasos.
Preguntas frecuentes ¿Qué es CWE-1330?
¿Qué gravedad tiene CWE-1330?
¿Qué lenguajes o plataformas se ven afectados por CWE-1330?
¿Cómo puedo prevenir CWE-1330?
¿Cómo detecta y corrige Plexicus CWE-1330?
¿Dónde puedo aprender más sobre CWE-1330?
Frequently asked questions
¿Qué es CWE-1330?
Sensitive data stored in memory hardware can still be accessed or reconstructed even after a standard clear or erase command has been executed.
¿Qué gravedad tiene CWE-1330?
MITRE no ha publicado una calificación de probabilidad de explotación para esta debilidad. Trátala como de impacto medio hasta que tu modelo de amenazas demuestre lo contrario.
¿Qué lenguajes o plataformas se ven afectados por CWE-1330?
MITRE lists the following affected platforms: Not OS-Specific, Not Architecture-Specific, Security Hardware, Not Technology-Specific.
¿Cómo puedo prevenir CWE-1330?
- Support for secure-erase commands that apply multiple cycles of overwriting memory with known patterns and of erasing actual content. - Support for cryptographic erase in self-encrypting, memory devices. - External, physical tools to erase memory such as ultraviolet-rays-based erase of Electrically erasable, programmable, read-only memory (EEPROM). - Physical destruction of media device. This is done for repurposed or scrapped devices that are no longer in use.
¿Cómo detecta y corrige Plexicus CWE-1330?
El motor SAST de Plexicus detecta la firma de flujo de datos para CWE-1330 en cada commit. Cuando hay coincidencia, nuestro agente Codex Remedium abre un PR de corrección con el código corregido, las pruebas y un resumen de una línea para el revisor.
¿Dónde puedo aprender más sobre CWE-1330?
MITRE publica la definición canónica en https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1330.html. También puedes consultar la documentación de OWASP y NIST para guías relacionadas.
Debilidades relacionadas
Weaknesses related to CWE-1330
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